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Abstract
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication promises a wide range of benefits for society. Within
future V2X-enabled intelligent transportation systems, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication
will allow vehicles to directly exchange messages, improving their situational awareness and al-
lowing drivers or (semi-)autonomous vehicles to avoid collisions, particularly in non-line-of-sight
scenarios. Thus, V2V has the potential to reduce annual vehicular crashes and fatalities by hun-
dreds of thousands. Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) is rapidly supplanting older V2V
protocols and will play a critical role in achieving these outcomes. As extremely low latency is re-
quired to facilitate split-second collision avoidance maneuvers, ensuring the availability of C-V2X
is imperative for safe and secure intelligent transportation systems. However, little work has ana-
lyzed the physical- (PHY) and MAC-layer resilience of C-V2X against intelligent, protocol-aware
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by stealthy adversaries. In this thesis, we expose fundamental
security vulnerabilities in the PHY- and MAC-layer designs of C-V2X and demonstrate how they
can be exploited to devastating effect by devising two novel, intelligent DoS attacks against C-V2X:
targeted sidelink jamming and sidelink resource exhaustion. Our attacks demonstrate different
ways an intelligent adversary can dramatically degrade the availability of C-V2X for one or many
vehicles, increasing the likelihood of fatal vehicle collisions. Through hardware experiments with
software-defined radios (SDRs) and state-of-the-art C-V2X devices in combination with extensive
MATLAB simulation, we demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of our attacks. We show that
targeted sidelink jamming can reduce a targeted vehicle’s packet delivery ratio by 90% in a matter
of seconds, while sidelink resource exhaustion can reduce C-V2X channel throughput by up to 50%
in similarly short order. We further provide and validate detection techniques for each attack based
on cluster and regression analysis techniques and propose promising, preliminary approaches to
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1 Introduction
The emerging family of technologies known as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication
promises a wide variety of societal benefits that range from the realization of fully autonomous
vehicles to the elimination of most traffic gridlock. V2X comprises several communication tech-
nologies including vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian
(V2P) and others [1]. Of these, V2V is considered among the most beneficial due to its anticipated
benefits for improving roadway safety. In V2V communication, so-called smart vehicles are able
to wirelessly communicate directly with each other, allowing every vehicle to be aware of the
location and motion of other vehicles in the area. Thus, V2V has the particular and unique benefit
of facilitating crash avoidance in non-line-of-sight (NLOS) situations where a driver or onboard
sensors (e.g., cameras, LiDAR) would not be able to perceive or give warning of an imminent
collision. One example of such a situation, at a “blind corner” intersection, is given in Figure 1. In
the U.S. alone, V2V is projected to reduce the number of vehicle crashes and collisions that occur
each year by up to 600, 000 [2], potentially saving thousands of lives annually.
(a) No V2V communication. (b) V2V communication.
Figure 1: An example of how V2V can be used to avoid a collision in a NLOS scenario.
With the potential to revolutionize the transportation sector through amassive reduction in
traffic congestion [3]; advancement towards fully autonomous consumer vehicles [4]; and significant
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reductions in roadway crashes, injuries, and fatalities [2]; V2V is a highly desirable technology.
However, precisely due to the safety-critical nature of V2V, it is imperative that proper steps be taken
to ensure V2V communication technologies are secure before human lives are entrusted to them.
Drivers—and, eventually, autonomous vehicles—will heavily depend on warnings and guidance
originating from V2V messages to make split-second decisions about when to swerve, brake, or
otherwise violently maneuver to avoid an anticipated collision. Therefore, any malicious action
that causes the V2V system to become unreliable, untrustworthy, or unavailable could have very
serious impacts on the safety of drivers and passengers as well as pedestrians and other bystanders.
As V2V has begun to move from theory to reality over the last several years, two major
technologies have competed for dominance in the burgeoning [5] V2V market: Dedicated Short-
Range Communication (DSRC), based on a decentralized version of IEEE 802.11 [6], and Cellular
Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X), based on LTE and 5G cellular technologies [7, 8, 9]. Being over
20 years old [10], DSRC was the sole V2V technology for many years and was therefore able to
gain acceptance in spite of serious limitations such as a low data rate, lack of multi-user access,
and unacceptably high latency [11]. Partly to address these shortcomings, C-V2X was introduced
in 2016 in Release 14 of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards for cellular
communication [7]. Based on LTE cellular technology, Release 14’s “LTE-V2X” V2V protocol
has since been updated and improved by Releases 15 (2018 [8]) and 16 (2020 [9]). The essence of
LTE-V2X is a unique LTE communicationmode called “sidelink” that allows direct communication
between devices (i.e., vehicles) in place of traditional uplink and downlink (wherein a device can
only communicate with other devices through a base station or similar LTE infrastructure). Sidelink
communication is ideal for V2V as it removes any requirement for vehicles to be in range of a base
station, a capability whose importance will surely be appreciated by anyone who has spent time
attempting to find cell service while driving on rural roads.
LTE-V2X is currently the technology of choice for V2X deployments in China [12], may
supplant DSRC in Europe [13], and has recently gained both industry [14, 15] and regulatory [16]
support in North America. Very recently, 3GPP also standardized 5G-based “New Radio Vehicle-
to-Everything” (NR-V2X) in Release 16 [9]. Rather than a successor to LTE-V2X, NR-V2X is
envisioned to be a complementary technology [17], with particular usefulness for applications that
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require very high data rates such as sharing real-time sensor data or streaming live video feeds
between vehicles [17, 18]. The most recent NR-V2X standard, Release 16, lays out this relationship
in detail as a part of its physical layer specifications [19], wherein it is stated that LTE-V2X will
continue to be an active component of future “5G C-V2X” systems [18]. Specifically, Release 16
asserts that LTE-V2X is to be used for safety-criticalmessages thatmustmeet precise periodicity and
latency requirements to ensure the availability of collision-avoidance functionality. The longevity
and relevance of LTE-V2X are further supported by the integral role played by LTE-V2X in the
current Release 17 draft standard for the “NR-V2X Phase 3” architecture [20], wherein LTE-V2X
continues its crucial Release 16 role handling safety-critical messages. Given the current and
continuing criticality of LTE-V2X in cutting-edge, 5G-enabled intelligent transportation systems,
as well as the general lack of substantive work on security issues in LTE-V2X, this thesis focuses
specifically on outstanding security issues in LTE-V2X.
Despite the preeminence and rising popularity of LTE-V2X, the security community
has so far largely overlooked it. Much recent work in the literature continues to be based on
DSRC (e.g., [21, 22, 23, 24]), and those works which do examine security issues in C-V2X
(e.g., [25, 26, 27, 28]) nearly always focus exclusively on NR-V2X. To date, despite the general
lack of security considerations included in the LTE-V2X standards [29, 30], there are only a
handful of works that have examined security issues in LTE-V2X, and even fewer have examined
security at the lower layers of the protocol. Those works which have examined lower-layer security
(e.g., [31, 32, 33, 34]) have often proposed either cryptographic or physical-layer approaches
to better secure LTE-V2X; however, these and other works deal almost exclusively with either
confidentiality or secrecy concerns. This is problematic, because while ensuring the availability of
any system is important, in LTE-V2X it is absolutely imperative due to the safety-critical nature of
the technology.
In this thesis, we begin to address this gap in the literature by examining the physical (PHY)
andMAC-layer security of LTE-V2X from an availability perspective. We particularly focus on how
unique aspects of LTE-V2X—for example, its use of decentralized, autonomous selection of time
and frequency resources to use for transmitting messages—make LTE-V2X particularly susceptible
to unique forms of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks are particularly insidious in V2V
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due to the nature of the technology; as described above, human lives are at stake when vehicles
with no LOS are on a collision course, and only the availability of LTE-V2X may be able to prevent
a tragic outcome. Yet, due to the lack of existing work in this area, a stealthy attacker might be
able to deny one or more vehicles the benefits of LTE-V2X at a critical moment, with a range of
potential consequences that extends all the way to resulting in avoidable collisions, injuries, and
deaths. Motivated by the need to ensure to the greatest extent possible that this sort of malicious
action cannot be undertaken, in this thesis we seek to answer the following important questions:
1. Are the PHY and MAC layers of LTE-V2X sufficiently secure as to prevent effective, intelli-
gent DoS attacks by a stealthy adversary?
2. If effective DoS attacks are found at the PHY/MAC layers of LTE-V2X, in what manner can
these attacks be effectively detected despite the attacker’s efforts to remain as undetectable
as possible?
To answer these questions, in this thesis we devise two novel, intelligent DoS attacks against LTE-
V2X which exploit unique features of the LTE-V2X PHY/MAC layers to achieve significant DoS
effects while remaining undetectable by common detection techniques. The original contributions
of this thesis are as follows:
1. A novel attack, targeted sidelink jamming, which exploits the distinctive, slot-based structure
of LTE-V2X channels, as well as the uniquely periodic nature of V2V messages, to target
and jam messages sent by a specific target vehicle with a success rate of up to 93%.
2. A second novel attack, sidelink resource exhaustion, in which knowledge of the LTE-V2X
MAC-layer is abused by making valid transmissions that cause severe degradation of LTE-
V2X channel throughput by deceiving other vehicles into using less bandwidth than is actually
available, causing a decrease in channel throughput of up to 50%.
3. We experimentally validate each of the above attacks using SDRs to successfully attack state-
of-the-art commercial LTE-V2X devices, affirming the real-world viability of our attacks.
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4. We further provide, through MATLAB simulation, evidence of our attacks’ effectiveness in
an LTE-V2X channel under varying states of busyness.
5. We evaluate the stealthiness of our attacks using MATLAB simulation, showing that state-
of-the-art techniques for detecting V2V DoS attacks are (at best) of limited use for detecting
our novel attacks.
6. We propose superior, demonstrably more effective techniques for detecting our attacks.
7. Finally, we propose preliminary mitigation approaches to address the vulnerabilities in the
PHY/MAC layers of LTE-V2X which we exploited with our attacks.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Section 2, technical information about the lower-layer
structure and behavior of LTE-V2X communication is provided along with a primer on V2V
communications. Section 3 provides a focused overview of related work on lower-layer security in
wireless systems generally and LTE-V2X in particular. Section 4 introduces our contributions and
provides some common assumptions for our threat models, while Section 5 introduces our targeted
sidelink jamming attack. Section 6 presents our sidelink resource exhaustion attack, following
which we compare our two attacks based on a variety of effort and efficiency metrics in Section 7.
Finally, we conclude with closing remarks and thoughts on future work in Section 8.
5
2 Preliminaries
Before describing related work or presenting our contributions, it is necessary to establish some
background on LTE-V2X communication as well as relevant V2V fundamentals.
2.1 LTE Vehicle-to-Everything (LTE-V2X)
LTE-V2X is based on LTE-Sidelink (“sidelink”), which was introduced in 3GPP Release 14 [7] as a
V2X-specific improvement on LTE Device-to-Device (D2D), an antecedent technology introduced
in 3GPP Release 12 [35] for public safety use (e.g., to allow direct communication between
firefighters’ cell phones outside of LTE network coverage).
2.1.1 LTE Sidelink Mode 4
Specifically for V2V, Release 14 introduced sidelink Mode 4, the only sidelink mode which allows
direct, device-to-device communication in situations where neither device is “in-coverage” (i.e.,
in communication range of an LTE base station). Mode 4 uniquely does not require base stations
(or any other LTE infrastructure) to synchronize devices in time and frequency or coordinate
resource allocation among user equipments (UEs). Instead, UEs operating under Mode 4 use
global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) (e.g., GPS) for synchronization in time. Using GNSS
for time synchronization replaces the use of primary and secondary synchronization signals in
traditional LTE; consequently, Mode 4 UEs consider all LTE subframes to be millisecond-aligned
on GNSS time. In this manner, each 1ms LTE subframe (see Section 2.1.2) becomes a “time
slot” in which one or more transmissions can occur. Although this is critical for ensuring the
ability of each vehicle to receive messages without needing to synchronize individually with each
transmitting unit, this use of GNSS as a global time reference makes it very easy - far easier than
in traditional LTE - for an attacker to accurately anticipate and act against transmissions made
in the sidelink channel. This can be a significant security problem, as we explore in Section 5.
Finally, it is important to establish that UEs operating in sidelink Mode 4 are required to use their
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maximum transmit power of 23 dBm at all times [36]. This requirement impacts our threat model
and assumptions (Section 4) as well as the impacts of our attacks (Section 7).
2.1.2 Structure of the LTE-V2X PHY layer
LTE sidelink supports either 10 or 20MHz channels. This thesis utilizes the 10MHz configuration,
a common assumption in the literature. In the time domain, LTE-V2X uses slot-based scheduling.
Within each 10ms LTE frame, ten 1ms subframes form the time slots used for transmitting
or receiving signals. Each LTE frame is globally synchronized in time but locally identified by
sequential system frame numbers (SFN) that allow a device to track frames as they elapse over time.
The subframes within each frame are in turn identified by a “sidelink frame index” (SFI) between
0−9. This is ideally suited to the highly periodic traffic used in V2V as it allows easy calculation
of transmission times (e.g., 100ms periodic transmissions might go out in SFNs 2, 12, 22, ... using
SLI 6 in each of those frames).
In the frequency domain, the 10MHz channel comprising 50 LTE resource blocks (RBs)
is divided into five 2MHz subchannels with 10 RBs each. Each subchannel is further divided
into control and shared (i.e., data) channels, with the first two RBs of the subchannel allocated to
the sidelink control channel (PSCCH) and the remainder to the sidelink shared channel (PSSCH).
The time- and frequency-domain structure of LTE-V2X is illustrated in Figure 2. As indicated in
Figure 2, a sidelink transmission can use one or more subchannels within a subframe, but any single
transmission must occur entirely within one subframe. A transmission is broken into a sidelink
control information (SCI) message, which is transmitted in the PSCCH, and a transport block (TB),
which carries the message data in the PSSCH. Importantly, no TB can be decoded without first
decoding the associated SCI message; thus, as exploited by the attack in Section 5, the dependence
of the data channel on the control channel can be a significant security problem in LTE sidelink.
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2.1.3 Semi-persistent scheduling (SPS)
Figure 2: LTE sidelink frame structure.
In the absence of LTE infrastruc-
ture to centralize resource schedul-
ing, UEs operating in sidelinkMode 4
use a sensing-based scheduling algo-
rithm called semi-persistent schedul-
ing, or SPS [19]. SPS is designed
to minimize packet collisions with-
out requiring vehicles to directly co-
ordinate with each other, without
the performance-inhibiting “backoff”
mechanisms of systems like 802.11, and to make use of the uniquely (within LTE) periodic nature
of V2V communication. For example, V2V basic safety messages are sent periodically by every
vehicle at a rate of 10Hz (see Section 2.2). Since all vehicles transmit with the same periodicity, it is
easy for a vehicle joining the system to listen to the channel, determine which radio resources (i.e.,
which subchannel(s) in which subframes) are not being used, and choose unused radio resources
to start using for its own transmissions.
SPS also requires vehicles to periodically choose new radio resources (i.e., subframes
and subchannels) through “resource reselection” at regular intervals. This requirement is due to the
highly mobile nature of V2V. If two or more vehicles are using the same radio resources and come
within communication range of each other, then their packets will start colliding and no messages
will get through from either vehicle. Forcing resource reselection at regular intervals ensures
that if and when situations like this occur, the effect will not last more than several messages
(at most). When messages are sent at a rate of 10Hz, SPS requires resource reselection after
every c transmissions, where c ∈ [5, 15]. The value of c is randomly chosen from this interval
after each resource reselection and decrements by one after each transmission, triggering the next
resource reselection when c = 0. Importantly, vehicles can choose to continue using their current
resources as well; each time resource reselection occurs, a vehicle will decide whether to choose
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new resources with pre-configured probability P ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. The effects of different
choices for P are explored in Section 5.4.
The resource reselection process is relatively straightforward. For a 1000-subframe (1 s)
“listening period” prior to resource reselection, a vehicle will listen to the LTE-V2X channel and
create a set of “candidate radio resources” (CRR) from which it ultimately selects new resources
to use. For a message periodicity of 100ms, a vehicle needs to select a system frame index, a
subframe index within those frames, and a base subchannel within that subframe. For example,
the resource set (3, 2, 4) would mean the vehicle transmits in the fourth subchannel of the second
subframe of the third out of every ten LTE frames. At reselection time (immediately after the
listening period), the vehicle reviews the data collected during the listening period and reduces
CRR by excluding resources which meet all of the following criteria:
1. A valid SCI message was received in the sidelink control channel
2. A valid data transport block (TB) was received in the sidelink shared channel using the
subchannel(s) indicated by the SCI message
3. The average “reference signal received power”1 for the subframe and subchannel(s) used for
the TB exceeds a defined threshold THrx
After excluding all resources that meet these criteria, the vehicle checks whether the number of
resources left in CRR comprise at least 20% of the total resources in one sensing window. If this
is not the case, the vehicle increases THrx by 3 dB and repeats the process. This allows the vehicle
to select resources which were sensed to be in use but had a weak signal, and thus most likely
belonged to vehicles which are a large distance away and/or moving away from the receiver.
1Defined in 3GPP TS 36.213 [19]; essentially just an average signal strength measurement for the demodulation
reference symbols of the shared channel.
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2.2 Fundamentals of V2V Communication
Although this thesis is primarily focused on LTE-V2X communication itself, some principles of
general V2V communication are important to establish. Since the primary use for V2V is collision
avoidance, one of the most important V2V messages is the basic safety message, or BSM. V2V-
equipped vehicles broadcast BSMs periodically at intervals between 20−100ms. This thesis uses
100ms as a standard interval, as is common in the literature, but it is important to note that the
20ms interval is allowable (as this is a key part of the attack in Section 6). BSMs contain basic
information about a vehicle’s location and motion (e.g., GPS position, speed and direction of travel)
that allows receiving vehicles to be aware of and, if necessary, take action to avoid a collision with
the sending vehicle. Under application-layer standards (e.g., [37]), BSMs also carry potentially
identifying information about a vehicle like its color, dimensions, make/model, and more. As the
specific data reported in a BSM may change, the size of BSMs may vary over time. However,
based on experiments with commercial LTE-V2X devices, we assume throughout this thesis that a
standard BSM occupies 2 LTE-V2X subchannels within a subframe.
It is important to note that while this thesis is focused on security issues at the lower layers
of LTE-V2X, there are upper-layer security requirements in place that are intended to mitigate
certain types of attacks. These security requirements, which are general to V2V and do not vary
between LTE-V2X and other technologies, are defined primarily in IEEE 1609.2-2016 [38], its
amendments [39, 40], and its subordinate standard IEEE 1609.2.1-2020 [41]. The 1609.2 suite
includes such security requirements as mandating digital signatures to authenticate BSMs, using
public-key certificates to validate message signatures, requiring that all authentication be made
pseudonymously to protect privacy, and so on. These upper-layer security requirements are worth
noting in order to (a) acknowledge that there are security considerations made in other areas of the
V2V protocol stack, and (b) to contextualize some comments referring to these standards made
further on in this document. Also, on rare occasions it is possible—though not, to the current body
of knowledge, in LTE-V2X—for security mechanisms at the upper layers to be compromised by




Lower-layer security in wireless communications is hardly a new concern. In fact, physical layer
security problems—for example, eavesdropping on sensitive communications—date back at least
as far as the European battlefields of 1914 [43]. Other physical layer threats, including jamming
attacks and more sophisticated forms of eavesdropping, emerged largely out of World War 2 [44].
However, physical layer security in the modern era is no longer exclusively a concern of the
battlefield. Due to the everyday ubiquity of wireless communication in modern life, as well as
the development of wireless systems more sophisticated than could have been imagined in those
early days when speaking in an obscure foreign language was enough to “secure” one’s sensitive
wireless traffic [45], the security of wireless systems is now a concern for all members of society.
This section begins with an overview of existing work on general DoS threats in V2V. We then
provide a more detailed review of the few existing works which directly relate to the focus of this
thesis—DoS attacks against LTE-V2X—followed by an overview of selected works that establish
the state-of-the-art techniques for detecting and mitigating such attacks.
3.1 Denial-of-Service Attacks Against V2V
At the PHY/MAC layers, the most common form of DoS attack in V2V is jamming. Jamming
attacks encompass a broad range of threats to V2V communication, but Benslimane and Nguyen-
Minh [46] provide a useful starting point for defining and discussing V2V jamming. In particular,
they choose packet delivery ratio (PDR) as the metric by which a jamming attack can be evaluated
(and, potentially, detected). PDR is also the primary evaluation metric for the attacks we present
in Sections 5 and 6. The authors of [46] point out that certain types of jamming attacks, particular
periodic jamming attacks, are generally more successful in V2V than in other technologies due to
the periodic, predictable nature of V2V transmissions. We exploit this V2V weakness through our
first attack in Section 5.
Variations of V2V jamming were examined by Puñal et al. [47] in 2015. Their work
describes three types of V2V jammers: constant jammers, which transmit continuously on some
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defined frequency band(s), periodic jammers, which alternate between transmitting and not trans-
mitting in defined intervals, and reactive jammers, which transmit in response to sensing energy
“above a certain threshold” [47] on a channel. These classifications are commonly accepted in the
literature and so are important to mention, although the two attacks presented in this paper generally
fall outside these definitions. Our targeted sidelink jamming attack (see Section 5) is similar to a
reactive jammer in that its parameters (e.g., transmission subframe) are defined by a target vehicle’s
transmissions, but the jamming pulses themselves are predicted based on the first received message
rather than based on each individual transmission by the target. Our other attack, based on resource
exhaustion rather than directly jamming transmissions, is most similar to a periodic jammer within
the paradigm of [47].
In the literature, jamming attacks against V2V take diverse approaches. Hussein, Mo-
hamed and Krings [48] present a hybrid jamming attack against DSRC which combines reactive
jamming and periodic jamming to suppress the periodic transmission of BSMs. Under DSRC,
unlike in LTE-V2X, only one vehicle is permitted to transmit at a time. Thus, the authors were
able to design a system which sensed when a vehicle was about to transmit and reacted by sending
periodic bursts of energy to keep the medium busy with varying-length jamming intervals, causing
BSMs that were supposed to be periodic to be queued while waiting for the medium to be free and
creating a backlog of messages at the transmitter. This attack specifically exploited the medium
contention mechanism of DSRC, so their approach is not applicable to LTE-V2X, but this work
illustrates one approach to jamming V2V communications. In a similar but different vein, in prior
work [42] we developed a reactive jamming attack against DSRC which exploited the nature of
802.11 transmission and the predictable structure of V2V BSMs to reactively jam messages from
a specific target vehicle in real time. We used careful, deliberate decoding of incoming DSRC
signals to recover identifying fields and identify the sender of each incoming message before the
entire message was received, allowing us to rapidly send a reactive jamming pulse to corrupt the
remainder of the message as it arrived at other receivers. This type of attack is highly efficient and
effective, but it cannot be applied against LTE-V2X due to the differences in PHY-layer techniques
between the two technologies. In DSRC, since only one vehicle can transmit at a time, each in-
coming message can be processed sequentially. LTE-V2X is very different; since multiple vehicles
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Table 1: Related works organized by V2V technology and primary area of focus.
Related Work Technology Primary Security Focus
Alipour-Fanid, Dabaghchian and Zeng [22] DSRC Availability
Benslimane and Nguyen-Minh [46] DSRC Availability
Feng and Haykin [49] DSRC Confidentiality
Gu et al. [50] DSRC Availability
Hussein, Mohamed, and Krings [48] DSRC Availability
Lyamin et al. [21] DSRC Availability
Pirayesh et al. [24] DSRC Confidentiality/Integrity
Puñal et al. [47] DSRC Confidentiality
Sun et al. [23] DSRC Availability
Twardokus et al. [42] DSRC Confidentiality
Lautenbach et al. [25] NR-V2X Confidentiality
Lai et al. [28] NR-V2X Availability
Lu et al. [26] NR-V2X Confidentiality
Nguyen, Lin and Hwang. [27] NR-V2X Availability
ElHalawany, El-Banna and Wu [31] LTE-V2X Confidentiality
Li et al. [51] LTE-V2X Availability
Liu et al. [33] LTE-V2X Integrity
Luo et al. [34] LTE-V2X Availability
Trkulja, Starobinski and Berry [52] LTE-V2X Availability
Wang et al. [32] LTE-V2X Integrity
Our work LTE-V2X Availability
may transmit at the same time, a receiver collects one subframe (1ms) of samples at a time, then
searches through the received data to iteratively decode any and all messages that were received in
that subframe of data. Thus, in LTE-V2X a message can only be recovered after it is received in its
entirety, precluding use of our technique from [42] to attack LTE-V2X communication. Both [42]
and [48] demonstrate some of the many reasons why most existing work on V2V DoS attacks,
which are usually designed for DSRC, cannot be applied to attacking LTE-V2X.
3.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks Against LTE-V2X
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two existing works that describe lower-layer DoS
attacks specifically designed for use against LTE-V2X. The first of these (Li et al. [51]) primarily
focuses on detecting such an attack and is described in Section 3.3. In the other work, Trkulja,
Starobinski and Berry [52] seek to demonstrate through modeling and simulation that LTE-V2X is
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prone to intelligent DoS attacks; specifically, they explore a process they call “adversarial resource
block selection” in which one or more vehicles contort their use of SPS (see Section 2.1.3) to
probabilistically choose resources that are more likely to be in use by other vehicles rather than
less likely (as SPS is intended to do). This approach is somewhat similar to the motivation for our
attack in Section 6, as like us their objective is to abuse SPS for malicious ends. However, where
the authors of [52] particularly focus on collusion attacks involving multiple malicious vehicles
working in tandem, our attacks are intended to be executed by a single attacker. The system model
in [52] is also somewhat oversimplified; for example, instead of subchannels and subframes they
simply treat each transmission as using one “resource block” and give little attention to the granular
details of LTE-V2X’s slot structure and radio resource allocation procedures. Some details of the
system model in [52] also do not align with LTE-V2X standards (e.g., they use a channel with 200
resource blocks, which is not possible in LTE-V2X as the maximum 20MHz bandwidth equates
to 100 resource blocks). While our simulated channel models are also simplified compared with
real-world operating conditions, our model accounts for significantly more details of SPS and the
PHY/MAC structure of LTE-V2X than [52] and we have taken care to ensure the parameters we do
model in our simulations are based on applicable LTE-V2X requirements from 3GPP (e.g., [7, 19]).
3.3 Detecting V2V Denial-of-Service Attacks
The most common approaches to detecting DoS attacks in V2V are based on evaluating PDR for
the overall system. PDR can have different definitions in different contexts. In this thesis, we define
PDR as a ratio of the number of packets transmitted by a vehicle (or all vehicles, for a system) to
the number of packets received correctly by at least one vehicle. This often involves developing
a method of estimating the number of periodic messages (e.g., BSMs) that should be received in
a given period of time, and then developing a threshold to raise an attack alert when PDR falls
too far below expectations. Benslimane and Nguyen-Minh present one such system in [46]. They
take a MAC rather than PHY-layer approach to detecting jamming, differentiating [46] from much
related work. The central tenet of their detection scheme is a probabilistic system of classifying
time slots where no BSMs are received as either acceptable, the result of a packet collision due to
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normal operation, the result of interference or noise due to unintentional activity, or as the result
of malicious jamming. While their scheme has great success in certain scenarios when the number
of vehicles in a system is restricted and known a priori, they acknowledge that their detection
mechanism is only around 50% accurate (at best) in less controlled scenarios. This is a common
shortcoming of existing work on V2VDoS detection as many such works (e.g., [21, 22, 53]) rely on
a priori knowledge of the number of vehicles within communication range. While we evaluated our
detection techniques using simulations with defined numbers of vehicles, our detection techniques
do not require advance knowledge of the number of vehicles in the system to be effective (although
their effectiveness, as discussed in Sections 5.6 and 6.7, does vary with the number of vehicles in
the system).
Li et al. [51] proposed a “resource exhaustion” attack against LTE-V2X in which an
attacker floods the network with high-priority packets that require immediate attention, leaving no
resources left to handle ordinary (i.e., lower priority) traffic from other vehicles. The motivation
for their attack is strikingly similar to ours in that the goal is for an attacker to exhaust network
resources by making legitimate transmissions; however, there are critical differences between our
attack in Section 6 and that of [51]. First, their attack is against LTE Sidelink Mode 3, which
involves vehicles communicating to each other through an LTE base station (in a similar manner
to mobile phones). In fact, the crux of their attack is flooding a base station with high-priority
requests, an approach which is entirely inapplicable to the our Mode 4 scenarios. Second, the
authors of [51] straddle the border between a lower- and upper-layer attack by relying on packet
priority, which may be technically a MAC-layer element but is often set and processed by the
upper layers. Our attack, which targets the MAC-layer scheduling algorithm of LTE-V2X in Mode
4 (see Section 2.1.3), is an entirely lower-layer approach that is quite distinct from this existing
work. In terms of effectiveness, the authors of [51] show simulation results indicating that their
attack can achieve a more significant reduction in channel throughput than ours, in some cases up
to 100%. However, they achieve these results at the expense of detectability; as their attack must
actively request resources from a base station—which requires authentication [38]—the attacker
must identify herself to the network in order to execute the attack. Even if the attacker forges or steal
credentials, her transmissions may still easily be identified by her exclusive use of the resources
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requested from the base station, once her requests are identified as malicious (by, for example, using
the scheme devised in [51]). Thus, while effective, the attack presented in [51] is not an intelligent
DoS attack like ours.
3.4 Mitigating V2V Denial-of-Service Attacks
Many works have examined the problem of mitigating V2V DoS attacks at all layers of the protocol
stack. Some, such as [54] and [55], have discussed DoS attacks at the upper layers and proposed
somemitigation techniqueswhich are indirectly of interest but not generally applicable to discussion
of mitigating lower-layer DoS attacks in V2V. Of greater relevance to this thesis are those works
which have examined mitigating jamming attacks against V2V systems. Feng and Haykin [49]
propose one such approach based on application of cognitive risk control (CRC) techniques. Their
proposal is to allow vehicles to adapt their behavior, particularly channel selection and transmit
power, based on behavioral observation of a smart jammer. Although they provide some promising
preliminary results, this work focuses on a limited case where a jammer is attempting to disrupt
communication between two specific vehicles. Their approach requires a vehicle to be capable of
accurately determining both the distance between itself and the jammer and the distance between
itself and the vehicle(s) to whom jammed messages are being sent. It may be possible to fulfill
this requirement when considering only two vehicles—though the authors admit this is already
challenging—but much less so in situations like ours, where BSMs are being sent to every vehicle
within several hundred meters of the sender. Therefore, it is doubtful that the mitigation technique
proposed in [49] could be extended to mitigate BSM jamming attacks.
Many mitigation techniques have been proposed that are more suitable for preventing
BSM jamming; however, these proposals often suffer from being designed specifically for DSRC;
thus, in one way or another, they are often inapplicable to LTE-V2X systems. For example, Gu et
al. [50] proposed a system to mitigate control-channel jamming in V2V systems. The authors of
this work examine the case where an attacker jams the V2V control channel to disrupt the delivery
of V2V messages to vehicles within range of the jamming signal, a conceptually similar attack
to the one we present in Section 5. Their idea is to use cooperative relaying of control-channel
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messages—i.e., vehicles for whom the control channel is jammed can still receive control-channel
messages via peer “cooperative relay” vehicles unaffected by the jamming—to mitigate the risk of
a control-channel jammer crippling an entire V2V system. This approach is efficient and effective;
however, it is designed specifically for the particular channel arrangement of DSRC, which differs
fundamentally from that of LTE-V2X. In DSRC, a given frequency band (e.g., 5.85−5.92GHz)
is subdivided into several 10MHz channels, one of which becomes the control channel while the
others become shared channels for transmitting data like BSMs. Importantly, this means that the
control channel can be jammedwithout directly impacting the shared channels. This is impossible in
LTE-V2X, which requires every shared-channel message (e.g., BSM) to have an associated control-
channel message informing the receiver of how to decode the transmitted data (see Section 2.1.2).
Also, while DSRC only has one control channel, LTE-V2X has one for every subchannel, making
any sort of message relaying technique difficult to apply as a relay vehicle would need to monitor at
least five different control channels at once for messages to relay. Thus, while a promising approach
for mitigating control-channel jamming in DSRC, the technique of [50] cannot be effectively used
to mitigate control-channel jamming attacks in LTE-V2X systems. Pirayesh et al. [24] proposed
another mitigation technique designed for DSRC that does not work for LTE-V2X. In [24], the
authors investigated mitigation of high-power jamming attacks against V2V communication. Their
work proposes two adaptations to the receiver design in IEEE 802.11p (i.e., DSRC) which they
show allow for mitigation of jamming attacks with a jamming-to-signal ratio as high as 25 dB. The
authors provide substantial experimental validation of their approach, which is based on spatial
filtering using a MIMO receiver; however, because the proposed modifications they make for
DSRC depend heavily on the existence of training fields in V2V message preambles—neither of
which exist in LTE-V2X—this technique is also not applicable to LTE-V2X. There are many more
examples of this shortcoming of existing works, but [50] and [24] provide illustrative examples
of why DSRC-based mitigation approaches, which are by far the most common in the literature,
cannot be applied to mitigating jamming attacks in LTE-V2X systems.
Given the lack of mitigation techniques for LTE-V2X jamming in the literature, it is
useful to look at existing work that has examined related problems (e.g., latency and throughput
issues, reducing packet loss) from a system performance perspective. For example, Mughal et
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al. [56] proposed modifying the sending and receiving procedures of LTE-V2X in response to the
problem of control-channel contention leading to high levels of packet loss when SCI messages
collide with each other and render associated V2V messages (e.g., BSMs) irrecoverable. While
their work is motivated by a desire to decrease the packet error rate that occurs in LTE-V2X due to
SPS resource reselection conflicts between vehicles, their approach is also useful as a technique to
mitigate the attack we propose in Section 5. In [56], the authors suggest changing the arrangement
of control and data channels within LTE-V2X transmissions so that every data transmission (e.g.,
BSM) does not require successfully receiving and decoding an SCI message as a prerequisite for
retrieving the transmitted data. Their scheme involves embedding control information within data
transmissions rather than sending control and data information separately, alleviating the problem
of congestion in (and, indeliberately, certain attacks against) the LTE-V2X control channel. We
discuss this work further in proposing mitigation techniques for one of our attacks in Section 5.7.
Another work which identifies techniques for performance improvements that can be co-opted for
mitigating attacks is [57]. In that work, Nabil et al. examine performance problems (e.g., low
PDR at high vehicle density) with the SPS algorithm. They particularly examine the effect that the
resource reservation interval (i.e., the period between resource reselections) has on overall system
performance. Among other conclusions, they find that increasing the resource reservation interval
increases PDR by lowering the probability that vehicles select conflicting resources during SPS
resource reselection, though only with certain costs in terms of data rate and latency. This is an
interesting approach to consider with respect to the attack we propose in Section 6, and we discuss
it further in our proposed mitigation techniques (see Section 6.8).
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4 Novel Denial-of-Service Attacks Against LTE-V2X
Having established the necessary technical background and reviewed related works, the remainder
of this thesis is focused on answering our two research questions. In Sections 5 and 6 we present
two novel DoS attacks, each of which exploits different fundamental flaws in the PHY and MAC
layers of LTE-V2X, thereby demonstrating that the lower layers of LTE-V2X are not sufficiently
secure as to prevent intelligent, protocol-aware DoS attacks from being effective. We also devise
and validate methods for detecting each attack and propose preliminary ideas for mitigating them,
providing a path to securing LTE-V2X against the threats we have identified.
In presenting each attack, we use a common parlance and make some common assump-
tions about both the attacker and the LTE-V2X environment. We assume a single attacker, “Eve,” is
to undertake each of our attacks. Eve is generally assumed to have similar capabilities to an ordinary
vehicle that is equipped with LTE-V2X technology. So, Eve is unrestricted in her movement and
may be either mobile or stationary. She has the ability to receive and transmit signals on channels
in the 5.9GHz LTE-V2X frequency band; further, she is able to transmit V2V messages which are
syntactically valid (i.e., compliant with communication requirements like message size) as well as
semantically valid (i.e., contain meaningful and appropriately formatted data) as necessary. We
assume Eve’s communication device may be equipped with multiple antennas, though they may
not always be necessary. Finally, to ensure Eve cannot be easily identified as malicious due to
non-compliance with basic operating requirements, we set Eve’s transmit power to 23 dBm per [36]
and we limit her to transmitting no more than one message every 20ms per [19].
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5 Targeted Sidelink Jamming Attack
In our first attack, targeted sidelink jamming, the attacker Eve aims to deny the collision-avoidance
benefits of V2V to a single, specific victim vehicle (“Alice”). Eve pursues this objective by
attempting to directly jam as many of Alice’s BSMs as possible, thereby decreasing Alice’s safety
on the road as other vehicles receive fewer of her BSMs, consequently become less aware of her
movements, and finally become more likely to maneuver in an unsafe manner that may result in a
collision with Alice. One example of such a scenario is depicted in Figure 3.
The informed reader may immediately ask how Eve is able to identify when a BSM
has come from her specific target, Alice, when V2V security standards (i.e., [38, 41]) specifically
require anonymization of BSM contents. A complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of
this thesis; however, there are several ways this identificationmight be accomplished. It is important
to note that the contents of a BSM, as defined by the industry standard [37], include such potentially
identifying information as the make, model, length, width, color, etc. of the vehicle which sent
the BSM. In certain contexts, this alone may be sufficient; for example, if Alice has a particularly
unusual combination of make, model, and color, then her messages may be easily identified by
these aspects. Of course, it is more likely that Alice is not visually unique, so other approaches
might be necessary. If Eve is able to maintain even intermittent visual contact with Alice, which
may be likely if Eve is following Alice in a separate vehicle, then such technologies and techniques
as directional antennas, angle-of-arrival analysis, etc. may be used to isolate Alice’s BSMs from
others. These techniques have been proposed for verifying positional and motion claims of BSMs
(e.g., [58, 59]) and might be co-opted for Eve’s nefarious intentions. In any case, these are a small
subset of the potential methods Eve might use to identify Alice’s BSMs, and a further discussion
is left to future work. From here on, Eve’s ability to identify Alice’s BSMs is assumed.
5.1 Attack Procedure
Eve begins by listening to the channel until she receives a BSM from Alice. Assuming, as we do,
that Alice is complying with LTE-V2X standards, this will occur within 100ms. When a BSM
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Figure 3: Potential consequences of the targeted sidelink jamming attack.
from Alice arrives, Eve records the SFN , SFI , and the subchannel(s) of that BSM as Alice’s.
Now, since Eve knows that the standard BSM interval is 100ms, she can accurately predict the
SFN and SFI of Alice’s next BSM; further, since Alice’s subchannel(s) will not change until
resource reselection occurs (see Section 2.1.3), Eve also knows which subchannel(s) Alice will
use to transmit her BSM. Collectively, this means Eve can predict both the time and frequency
resources not only of Alice’s next BSM, but of her next several BSMs, with near-perfect accuracy.
Put another way, if Alice’s first BSM arrives in subframe (SFN, SFI), then Eve knows Alice’s
future BSMs will arrive (using the same subchannel(s)) in subframes (SFN + 10i, SFI), where
i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} and n ∈ [5, 15]). Figure 4 illustrates this attack procedure.
At this point, Eve knows exactly which time and frequency resources Alice will use for
her next several BSMs. Eve’s next step is to attempt to prevent other vehicles from receiving those
BSMs, which she does by transmitting her own messages, in the same resources, that collide with
Alice’s BSMs and make them unrecoverable by receivers. However, Eve does not simply transmit
a complete BSM, because this would be inefficient2. Instead, to jam each BSM, Eve transmits an
SCI message in the control channel to collide with the SCI message associated with that BSM.
2Also, it might make Eve more detectable. Consider what would happen if Alice stopped transmitting for some reason
and Eve, unaware, continued transmitting in what she believes are still Alice’s resources. If Eve transmitted complete
BSMs, or even just a large amount of noise across the subchannels (formerly) used by Alice, it might be immediately
obvious to an observer that an attacker was present.
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Figure 4: Targeted sidelink jamming attack procedure.
Now, when a receiver attempts to process (SFN , SFI) and recover the BSM, the receiver will be
unable to properly recover Alice’s SCI message; consequently, the receiver will also be unable to
recover the associated BSM3.
In Figure 4, the SCI message associated with the first of Alice’s BSMs to arrive at Eve
is shown in yellow and the SCI messages of subsequent BSMs in red, indicating Eve’s deliberate
collision with them. Incidentally, this approach to jamming Alice’s BSMs has the advantage
of being highly deniable in LTE-V2X due to its use of SPS, because of which vehicles may, not
infrequently, select conflicting resources and transmit colliding SCI messages, an occurrence which
appears identically to Eve’s actions against Alice. Related work has shown that the overall PDR
of an LTE-V2X channel can drop significantly due to this result of using SPS—in extreme cases,
by as much as 40% [57]—even without an attacker being present. Therefore, the loss of a small
number of BSMs (i.e., the BSMs from Alice which are jammed by Eve) is likely to be attributed to
the general, expected packet loss under SPS. We discuss this further in Section 5.5.
Eve continues this pattern of attack, jamming Alice’s BSMs at 100ms intervals indefi-
nitely until it is time for Alice to reselect her resources, which occurs every 5−15 messages with
probability P ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} (see Section 2.1.3). Importantly, Eve needs to be able to
detect when Alice reselects resources so that Eve can adjust her jamming accordingly. To do this,
in between jamming Alice’s BSMs, Eve continues to listen to the channel and process incoming
BSMs, checking each one to see whether it was sent by Alice. If a BSM is received fromAlice using
a different SFN , SFI or subchannel than Eve expects, then Eve can infer that Alice has reselected
her resources. Eve can then simply update her record of Alice’s resource reservation (i.e., SFN ,
3Recall from Section 2.1.2 that a valid SCI message is required in order to decode any LTE-V2X transmission.
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SFI , and subchannel(s)) and continue jamming Alice’s BSMs at 100ms intervals. Thus, with the
exception of the first BSM that Alice sends after reselecting resources (i.e., maximally one out of
every 5−15 BSMs), Eve is able to accurately jam all of Alice’s BSMs. This observation yields an
anticipated degradation of Alice’s PDR of between 80% (4
5
) and 93% (14
15
) overall, making this a
very effective form of DoS attack.
5.2 Experimental Validation
We evaluated the real-world viability of our attack experimentally, using an SDR and a proof-
of-concept software implementation to effectively attack state-of-the-art commercial LTE-V2X
equipment.
5.2.1 Experimental hardware
Figure 5: Cohda Wireless MK6C evaluation kit.
Our experimental setup required a combi-
nation of hardware devices. To represent
two “vehicles”—the target, Alice, as well as
a second vehicle, “Bob,” to receive Alice’s
messages—we used state-of-the-art commer-
cial LTE-V2X equipment from Cohda Wire-
less [60] (see Figure 5). Testing our attack
against these devices, which are widely used
in real-world roadway testing of V2V/V2X de-
ployments, strengthens the validity of our re-
sults and affirms the real-world viability of our
attack. For Eve, we used a USRP B210 SDR equipped with two 5 dBi antennas as well as a
GPSDO module for GNSS time synchronization. To synchronize all devices in time, we used a
LimeSDR to transmit synthesized GNSS signals which were generated using GPS-SDR-SIM [61].
Our experimental setup is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Experimental setup for evaluating the targeted sidelink jamming attack.
5.2.2 Proof-of-concept software implementation
We implemented a proof-of-concept version of our attack in C++. To a limited extent, we made
use of open-source libraries from srsRAN [62] as a starting point, and we drew some insight
from examination of prior work by Eckermann et al. [63]. However, significant extensions to
and improvements on these works were required to meet our particular requirements. Among
other capabilities, we developed support for real-time analysis of received signals and created the
capacity for time-scheduled transmissions of LTE-V2X messages. Further, we undertook the non-
trivial task of combining entirely separate transmit and receive functionalities (based on different
C/C++ libraries) to develop a sidelink application that can be used with a dual-antenna USRP to
emulate a vehicle (or attacker). A part of this sidelink application that was developed in the course
of completing this thesis has been submitted for inclusion in an open-source V2V security project
we developed in prior work [42], and that component of this thesis work will be publicly released
in an upcoming version of that project.
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5.2.3 Experimental setup
We configured Alice and Bob (the two Cohda LTE-V2X devices) to transmit BSMs at the standard
10Hz rate for a period of ten minutes. To obtain a baseline measurement for PDR in the absence
of an attacker, at the conclusion of this period we reviewed the packet capture logs on each device
and compared the number of BSMs received by each device to the expected quantity of BSMs sent
in a ten-minute period. From this analysis, we determined that the baseline PDR in our controlled
experimental environment was nearly perfect (> 99.85%4) in the absence of an attacker. This
justifies assignment of any more significant decrease in PDR that we observe during evaluation of
the attack to Eve’s actions rather than to environmental factors or other experimental biases.
To evaluate our attack, we once again configured Alice and Bob to transmit BSMs at a
rate of 10Hz. We set the transmit power for both Alice and Bob to 23 dBm, which is both the
maximum allowable and default power setting for the Cohda MK6C devices. We configured Eve,
using a dual-antenna SDR as described above, to execute our proof-of-concept implementation
of the targeted sidelink jamming attack against Alice. Eve transmits with an approximate5 power
level of 10 dBm to send her jamming signals against Alice’s BSMs. Note that this power level is
significantly lower than that used by Alice, an observation of relevance to later discussion about
the efficiency of this attack in Section 5.3.
5.2.4 Experimental results
Our experimental evaluation of the attack was very positive. As shown in Figure 7, Eve was able to
reduce Alice’s PDR below 20% after 1 s (10 BSMs) of jamming. Eve’s PDR levels off around 10%
over time, confirming the expected 80−93% reduction in Alice’s PDR as a result of the attack. One
can also see from Figure 7 that Bob’s PDR is negligibly affected, which is very important for Eve’s
ability to remain undetected. These results validate the real-world viability of our targeted sidelink
jamming attack against state-of-the-art commercial LTE-V2X equipment. Also, in demonstrating
4Alice and Bob received 5, 992 and 5, 994 BSMs, respectively, out of an expected 6, 000 over the course of 10minutes.
5The USRP B210 manufacturer, Ettus Research/NI, does not supply a precise value, specifying only a maximum RF
output power of “>10 dBm” [64]. However, related work has found that 10 dBm is an accurate estimate for the B210’s
transmit power at RF frequencies close to 6GHz [65].
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Figure 7: Experimental results showing the effectiveness of targeted sidelink jamming.
the viability of an effective, intelligent, protocol-aware DoS attack against LTE-V2X, we have
answered our first research question in the negative. That is, we have demonstrated that the LTE-
V2X PHY/MAC layers are not sufficiently secure as to prevent such intelligent DoS attacks from
being possible.
5.3 Efficiency and Effort Considerations
Beyond demonstrating a proof-of-concept implementation of our attack, some further discussion
is in order regarding the effectiveness and considerations required for the attack to be executed in a
more realistic environment.
5.3.1 Jamming-to-signal ratio
Jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR), as measured at an arbitrary receiver, is a common way of evaluating
the effort that is required for an attacker (i.e., jammer) to successfully prevent a signal from being








where Pr is the power of the received signal, Pt is the transmit power, Gt is the gain of the transmit
antenna, Gr is the gain of the receiver antenna, λ is the signal wavelength, and dt is the distance
between transmitter and receiver. From the Friis equation, we can derive a general formula for JSR
(substituting subscript J to denote jammer variables or subscript S to indicate those for the sender






















However, this equation is for a real unit of power (e.g., in Watts), whereas we want to calculate JSR
in decibels. JSR in decibels is given by (3) below.
J
S







= PJ +GJ + 20 log (dS)− PS −GS − 20 log (dJ) (3)
Finally, using the experimental values given in Table 2, we can use (3) to calculate a JSR that we
know from our experiments is sufficient for the attack to effective.
J
S
= PJ +GJ + 20 log (dS)− PS −GS − 20 log (dJ)
= 10 + 5 + 20 log (2)− 23− 4− 20 log (0.5)
= 0.041 dB
Given an experimental JSR of 0.041 dB, we know our attack works when the jamming signal
has roughly6 the same strength as the jammed signal. In our parlance, then, Eve’s jamming
transmissions should minimally have the same signal strength as Alice’s transmissions at the
receiver(s) in order to be certain—insofar as our experimental results can guarantee—that Alice’s
BSM will be irrecoverable by those receiver(s). This has some obvious ramifications for the real-
world execution of our attack. For one thing, Eve will need to consider her positioning with respect
to Alice very carefully in order to ensure she can achieve the necessary JSR. Similarly, she may
wish to increase the power with which she transmits her jamming signals, potentially as high as the
6To be precise, when the jamming signal is 100.041/10 = 1.0095 times as strong as the jammed signal. However, for
the purposes of discussion, this is negligible and can be treated as an effective JSR of 1 (0 dB).
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Table 2: Values for experimental parameters that affect jamming-to-signal ratio.
Experimental Variable Symbol Value
Jammer power PJ 10 dBm
Victim’s transmit power PS 23 dBm
Jammer antenna gain GJ 5 dBi
Victim’s transmit antenna gain GS 4 dBi
Distance between jammer and receiver dJ 0.5m
Distance between victim and receiver dS 2m
Wavelength (f = 5.92GHz) λ 0.0508m
limit we set (23 dBm—see Section 4)7 where she transmits with equal power to Alice. Figure 8
illustrates an example of these considerations with a more realistic distance of 50m between Eve
and Alice during the attack. As shown by the left-hand subplots of Figure 8, if Eve uses her
maximum transmit power of 23 dBm, she can achieve a JSR of 0 dB or better over the majority of
a 40, 000m2 area centered on her location. However, if she only uses 10 dBm transmit power, her
effective jamming area drops dramatically (as shown by the right-hand subplots of Figure 8). Of
course, a real attacker would take many factors into account when selecting her transmit power and
position with respect to Alice (e.g., specific desired outcome, road layout in the area, traffic speed),
but the example given in Figure 8 demonstrates the necessity of doing so solely on the basis of
achieving the required JSR.
5.3.2 Efficiency
Another important consideration is the level of effort that Eve is required to put in to successfully
accomplish her goals (of jamming Alice’s BSMs). One way of evaluating this is calculating the
duty cycle of the attack. Duty cycle has many definitions, but here we define it as the ratio of the
jammed bandwidth to the bandwidth that is ultimately affected by the jamming signal. As described
in Section 5, each jamming signal is constituted by a single SCI message, which has a width of 2
sidelink resource blocks (400 kHz). In each instance of jamming, though, an entire BSM is rendered
unrecoverable. Since a standard-size BSM uses 20 resource blocks (including the jammed SCI
7NB:We showed through our experiments that it is not necessary for Eve to transmit with equal power to Alice, though.
This gives Eve latitude to vary her transmit power as needed to achieve her goals and does not lock her into using a
higher, more detectable power level when doing so is not required.
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message), or 4MHz of bandwidth, the duty cycle for our jammer is 400e3
4e6
= 0.1 = 10%. This is a
respectably low, if not a particularly efficient result. We discuss this further in Section 7.
(a) JSR at (x, y) when PJ = PS = 23 dBm. (b) JSR at (x, y) when PJ=10 dBm, PS=23 dBm.





















(c) Overhead view for PJ = PS = 23 dBm.





















(d) Overhead view for PJ=10 dBm, PS=23 dBm.
Figure 8: JSR for a receiver located at (x, y) within a 40000m2 area centered on Eve. Red lines indicate the
limits of Eve’s effective jamming range.
5.4 Modeling LTE-V2X in MATLAB
Although experimental work with hardware devices was critical to affirm the viability of our attack
against real LTE-V2X equipment, we cannot reasonably extrapolate from our experimental results
against one device to describe the impact of our attack on an LTE-V2X channel used by many more
vehicles. As this evaluation is necessary in order to determine how detectable the attack is, we
created an LTE-V2X system model using MATLAB. We modeled a standard 10MHz LTE-V2X
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channel with 5 subchannels (as described in Section 2.1.2), using a matrix-based representation
of channel resources to track transmissions and record packet collisions. Figure 9 shows an
example of how a sidelink frame is represented in our model, with color scaling to indicate which
resources were used for transmissions. Following LTE-V2X standards, we configured simulated
vehicles to transmit BSMs at the standard 10Hz rate in this channel, with each BSM’s size set at 2
subchannels (based on commercial standards [37, 67]). Finally, we implemented the SPS algorithm
in accordance with 3GPP TS 36.213 [19], configuring each simulated vehicle to regularly reselect
resources based on channel usage in the same manner as real vehicles would do.

















Figure 9: A 10ms sidelink frame as represented
within our LTE-V2X model. Yellow resources have
been used by vehicles to transmit BSMs.
This channel model is deliberately
“perfect”—i.e., the causes for packet loss are
limited to packet collisions resulting from SPS
and malicious actions by a DoS attacker; equiv-
alently, we assume that every transmitted BSM
from any vehicle will be successfully received
by every other vehicle unless it either collides
with another vehicle’s BSM (due to SPS re-
source conflicts) or is blocked by an attacker.
Our reason for using this perfect channel model
is to create a worst-case scenario for an attacker
whowishes to remain undetected. In ourmodel,
the attacker’s actions must cause sufficiently little effect on overall PDR as to be statistically difficult
to distinguish from the packet loss which results from SPS; otherwise, the attack will be detectable.
We argue that if the effects of our attack on PDR cannot be reliably distinguished from SPS-based
packet loss alone in this perfect channel, then it follows that our attack will be similarly (or even
more) difficult to detect using PDR in a realistic channel where factors like noise, fading, etc. will
all contribute to cause additional packet loss and make distinguishing the packet loss caused by an
attack even more challenging.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, LTE-V2X requires a pre-configured, global P value
(P ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}) to be used by all vehicles as the probability with which they will select
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Figure 10: Average PDR for different values of P when no attacker is present.
new resources during reselection (as opposed to retaining their current resources) [19]. We wanted
to select P for our simulations such that packet loss would be minimized when no attacker was
present (for the reasons expressed above), so we ran several simulations with no attacker while
setting the value of P to each of the possible options8. These simulations involved 60 vehicles
transmitting BSMs for a period of 100 simulated seconds. We calculated the average PDR for each
value of P therefrom; as shown in Figure 10, we found that overall PDR decreases slightly for
higher values of P . This is logical, since vehicles that reselect resources more often are also more
probable to sometimes select conflicting resources. Based on these results, we chose to use P =0.2
in our simulations so as to maximize PDR. Concomitantly, these results allowed us to verify that
our LTE-V2X model compares favorably with other simulations of SPS in LTE-V2X from related
work (e.g., in [57, 68]), suggesting that our simulation parameters are reasonable with respect to
the current literature.
5.5 Detection Through Packet Delivery Ratio
In Section 3, we established that the most common approach to detecting jamming attacks in V2V
is through monitoring overall PDR (in this case, of the LTE-V2X channel). We now show, using
our LTE-V2X channel model, that PDR-based approaches are unreliable for detecting our targeted
sidelink jamming attack because of its minimal impact on overall channel PDR.
8For P = 0, vehicles never reselect resources, and collisions are extremely numerous since vehicles will never attempt
to correct collisions which exist from the beginning. As setting P = 0 is unlikely in practice for exactly this reason,
we do not consider it here.
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5.5.1 Monitoring overall PDR
We consider a hypothetical system monitor who attempts to detect jamming attacks by monitoring
the overall PDR of an LTE-V2X channel and raising an alert when that PDR falls below a certain
threshold. We assume the monitor can predict the number of vehicles using the channel, and hence
the number of BSMs that it should receive in a given time period, with reasonable accuracy. This
may, for example, be accomplished by reviewing historical traffic data (e.g., [69]) for metrics like
vehicle density, speed, and direction of travel at various times of day and extrapolating therefrom.
Alternately, the monitor may make these predictions based on its own long-term monitoring of
the channel, e.g., through one or another type of moving average. Based on the number of BSMs
it expects to receive for an accurately estimated number of vehicles, we assume the monitor can
devise a statistical test and alert to a possible attack if this test is not met by data collected during
channel monitoring.
Irrespective of the specific test used to define a PDR-based detection threshold PDRTH ,
it will always be a function of the number of vehicles nv using the channel and can be expressed as
PDRTH (nv). Now, over an interval of t seconds, the monitor will calculate its observed PDR as
a test statistic based on nv, the rate r at which vehicles transmit BSMs, and the number of BSMs b
that the monitor receives in that interval. As r and t are known a priori, this makes PDRmonitor a
function of nv and b as expressed by:




Now, we can say the attack is detectable whenever PDRmonitor (nv, b) < PDRTH (nv); in combi-
nation with (4), this yields:
b
nvrt
< PDRTH (nv) (5)
Then, (5), defines an inequality for detection that is useful irrespective of the specific statistical
mechanism used to define PDRTH (nv). We can take this one step further by defining b more
clearly. In our model, packet loss can only result from either packet collisions (due to SPS) or from
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Figure 11: PDR under attacks of varying duration against PDRTH (nv).
a DoS attack—in the case of our attack, from a jammer’s interference—so we can express b as:
b = bsent − blostSPS − blostjammed (6)
Finally, combining (5) and (6) yields:
bsent − blostSPS − blostjammed
nvrt
< PDRTH (nv) (7)
In (7), a relationship is illustrated which is responsible for the unreliability of using PDR as a
DoS-detection metric. Note that if blostjammed were removed from the left-hand side of (7), then the
inequality would always be true for any reasonable statistical test used to define PDRTH (nv).
Thus, whether or not the attack is detectable relies solely on the number of messages an attacker
jams in an interval of t seconds, leaving it up to the attacker to modify her behavior in order to
beat this attempt at detection. Further, (7) illustrates the fundamental problem with using PDR as a
detection metric in LTE-V2X systems. Because SPS always causes packet loss, particularly when
higher numbers of vehicles are using the channel, the definition of PDRTH (nv)must always allow
for some level of packet loss (e.g., using standard error or a confidence interval) without raising an
alarm; therefore, if blostjammed is less than or approximate to this necessary allowance for packet loss,
the attack will be difficult or impossible to detect.
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We can illustrate this problem with an example using our MATLAB model of an LTE-
V2X channel. We consider a monitor who defines PDRTH (nv) based on mean PDR over time.
This monitor tracks mean PDR for each nv ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . , 200} based on observation, calculating
a 95% confidence interval on the mean PDR for each nv. Then, the monitor defines PDRTH (nv)
as the least-squares regression line for the lower-bound values of the confidence intervals. We ran
1-minute simulations of the LTE-V2X channel using our MATLAB model, calculating the mean
PDR and confidence intervals accordingly. This yielded a detection threshold of:
PDRTH (nv) = −0.0002v + 1.0027 (8)
From (8), one can see that the negative slope δ=−0.0002 confirms the expected decrease in
PDRTH (nv) as nv increases. This, in turn, means that a DoS attack like targeted sidelink jamming
will be less detectable (based on PDR) at higher values of nv. To demonstrate this, we ran additional
1-minute simulations, this time adding in Eve, who executes the targeted sidelink jamming attack
with an (experimentally validated) ability to knock out 14/15 of BSMs from one vehicle. From (7),
detectability is dependent on the number of BSMs jammed by Eve, and hence on the duration of
Eve’s attack. We therefore evaluated different attack durations of 15, 30 , 45, and 60 seconds and
compared the packet loss caused by the attack against PDRTH (nv) for all nv ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 200}
to see if the effects of the attack can be distinguished from the expected packet loss due to SPS. As
illustrated by Figure 11, this is not the case. Particularly for higher values of nv, PDR during the
attack is similar to—and sometimes indistinguishable from—PDR in the absence of an attacker.
Note also that even in the worst case we evaluated (a 60 s attack with nv < 5), PDR remains within
3% of expected levels. For all of the attack durations, PDR is generally within 1% of expected
levels for all nv > 100. These results illustrate the difficulty of detecting targeted sidelink jamming
using PDR—even in our perfect model, the effects of the attack are often indistinguishable from
expected levels of packet loss. Therefore, we contend that detection in a more realistic environment
(with packet loss from noise, interference, etc.), the attack would be extremely difficult to detect
using PDR as a metric.
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5.5.2 Monitoring PDR for individual vehicles
An ideal method of detecting our attack would be monitoring the PDR for individual vehicles rather
than for the system as a whole. Hypothetically, if a monitor could somehow accurately determine
an expected value (and related threshold) for per-vehicle PDR, then it could raise an alert to an
attack if the PDR for a particular vehicle fell below the expected threshold. Against this approach,
Eve could not hide the impact of her jamming amongst the normal, system-wide packet loss due to
SPS like she can to evade detection based on overall PDR. Since the expected PDR for individual
vehicles must surely be well above the 7−20% that can be achieved by Alice during the attack -
otherwise, LTE-V2X would be useless - such a hypothetical system monitor could surely detect
Eve’s attack when Alice’s PDR suddenly dropped to less than 20%.
Unfortunately, this monitoring approach is generally infeasible in V2V. This is primarily
due to the highly unpredictable nature of the V2V environment in combination with the lack of
context (to the monitor) for a particular vehicle’s movements. A monitor may fail to receive certain
BSMs that are blocked from reaching it; for example, what would happen if a large commercial
truck pulled over right next to a roadside monitor, creating a large amount of attenuation for signals
passing through it to reach the monitor device? Such an incident could easily lead to false positives
as the monitor measures a lower PDR for the vehicles whose BSMs are being stopped by this
obstacle, does not understand the benign reason for this, and subsequently raises false alarms about
an attack. Separately, but similarly, either a static or mobile monitor would suffer from a lack of
knowledge about the channel conditions away from its location, and so it might inaccurately expect
a low (or high) PDR for all vehicles within the entire 1 km communication range it monitors, based
only on localized measurements from vehicles that occupy a small fraction of that area.
A secondary barrier to this approach is the lack of identifying information for BSMs at
the lower communication layers. LTE-V2X transmissions give no identifying information about
the transmitting unit in the lower layers (e.g., there is no MAC address used in LTE sidelink), so a
monitor that functions only at the lower layers—which is often desired, if not required, to reduce
latency in monitoring systems—will have no ability to determine which BSMs come from which
vehicles. To a certain extent, this might be overcome through similar methods as we propose the
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attacker could use to identify her target in Section 5.1, but it is much less likely that these techniques
could feasibly be used to accurately identify the dozens to hundreds of vehicles that could be in
range of the monitor at any one time. Also, because vehicles frequently change the resources
that they are using, there is no way to establish a probabilistic identification of a vehicle based on
its prolonged use of a particular resource. If the monitor were to have access to the upper layer
protocols aswell, then some identifying information could possibly be used; however, due to the lack
of persistent identifiers in V2V (i.e., the exclusive use of pseudonymous identification [38]), even
this level of access would be insufficient to accurately calculate statistics like PDR for individual
vehicles. Therefore, although Eve might have difficulty avoiding detection based on per-vehicle
PDR monitoring, we contend that such an approach is unrealistic and we do not concern ourselves
further with attempting to avoid this detection technique.
5.6 Better Detection Through Cluster Analysis
Having shown the unreliability and infeasibility, respectively, of attempting to detect targeted
sidelink jamming by monitoring overall or per-vehicle PDR, we propose a superior alternative. To
this end, it is useful to note that although a vehicle will periodically reselect the resources it uses
for transmitting BSMs, there is tendency for the vehicle to select its new resources within the same
“frame index” (SFN mod 10) that it is currently using. This occurs in part because new resources
are not always reselected (only with probability P ) and also because vehicles try to maintain their
BSMperiodicity across the reselection as close to 100ms as possible. So, a vehicle is likely tomake
use of the same SFN index for its transmissions over time irrespective of resource reselections (i.e.,
a vehicle that enters resource reselection transmitting in the seventh of every ten frames is likely
to continue doing so after resource reselection, although it will likely choose different subframes
and subchannels within that frame). In turn, this means that our targeted jamming attack is likely
to impact the same frame index over a significant period of time, leading to frames with that index
having lower overall PDR than others. Therefore, a useful detection approach is to monitor PDR
changes in specific frame indexes over a sliding time window of∼10 seconds and attempt to detect
frame indexes with anomalously low PDR values, which may indicate an attack is underway against
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vehicle(s) that that are using resources in those frames.
Essentially, this approach requires monitoring the channel for 10-second periods and
recording how many messages are received in each frame, as well as how many collisions are
detected. Related work has shown that detecting packet collisions in V2V is possible [46], and
doing so allows the monitor to extrapolate how many messages were actually sent versus how
many were received, leading to a PDR calculation for that frame. Then, the monitor can align all
of the per-frame PDR measurements by frame index and compare their PDR values to check for
anomalies. If a targeted sidelink jamming attack is occurring, then a specific frame index (wherein
the victim is transmitting BSMs) should have a much larger number of frames with lower PDR
compared to other frame indexes. This is an anomaly detection problem, so cluster analysis is
an appropriate and useful technique to apply. Specifically, we propose using the DBSCAN [70]
clustering algorithm for this task. DBSCAN is a classic cluster analysis algorithm based primarily
on measuring geometric (or related) distance between data points. Compared with other clustering
algorithms (e.g., k-Means, hierarchical), DBSCAN is ideally suited for detecting our attack because
it can detect clusters of abnormal shape and is specifically designed to identify outliers (i.e., in our
case, to identify abnormal PDR levels in certain frames) [71]. DBSCAN is also an unsupervised
algorithm and requires neither a priori specification of the number of clusters (a limitation of k-
Means clustering) nor manual labeling of data, making it a good candidate for autonomous security
services to be run on vehicles or standalone roadside infrastructure units. In our case, we propose
to use DBSCAN to cluster the PDR values recorded for each frame index and identify outliers;
then, if a particular frame index is determined to have significantly more outliers than others, an
alert may be raised to a possible attack.
In addition to a data set to analyze, DBSCAN requires three parameters: the minimum
number of points to form a cluster (or the “density threshold” [70]), a radius value ε to determine
which points fall close enough to others to form a cluster, and specification of a function to calculate
distance between points. We used Euclidean distance due to our relatively uncomplicated data set
(containing only PDR values and their associated frame indexes) and we chose 50 as the minimum
number of points to form a cluster based on the dimensionality of our data. As shown in Figures 12a
and 12b, we chose an ε-value of 0.1 based on sorted k-Nearest distance analysis of our data set,
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(a) k-Nearest distance with no attacker.
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(b) k-Nearest distance with attacker.
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(c) DBSCAN with no attacker.
2 4 6 8 10




















(d) DBSCAN with attacker.
Figure 12: Results showing how DBSCAN can be used to effectively detect targeted sidelink jamming.
which was obtained from simulation of PDR over a 100-second period with 100 simulated vehicles
using the LTE-V2X channel. Note that this was a number of vehicles for which we showed PDR
monitoring to be unreliable for detecting an attack in Section 5.5. During the simulation, the attacker
targeted a vehicle who transmitted on varying resources in every seventh frame. Figure 12d calls
out successful identification of the attack. The greatest number of anomalous data points - i.e., PDR
measurements lower than normal - are associated with the seventh of every ten frames, in which the
attacker was causing packet collisions with its target vehicle. The distinction is visually obvious
(another advantage of DBSCAN) when compared with the results in Figure 12c, recorded from the
same simulation parameters sans attacker. Thus, as desired, we have successfully demonstrated that
DBSCAN cluster analysis is a useful approach for detecting our targeted sidelink jamming attack;
further, we have shown that DBSCAN detection works where the commonly-used overall PDR
38
metric is highly unreliable. This further addresses our second research question by demonstrating
a method of detecting Eve’s targeted sidelink jamming attack despite her efforts to blend in with
normal system PDR degradation due to SPS.
5.7 Mitigation Techniques
To address the threat we have identified, we propose two mitigation techniques. Each technique has
some grounding in related work, and while we leave a complete investigation of their consequences
and effectiveness to future work, we contend that these approaches are reasonable and promising
in relation to the current literature.
5.7.1 Adjusting the arrangement of sidelink channels
The targeted sidelink jamming attack works because of the precise placement of SCI messages
within each LTE-V2X transmission. As described in Section 2.1.2, the control-channel SCI
message is always placed in the first two resource blocks of the base subchannel of a transmission;
for example, a BSM that is sent using subchannels 3−4 of an arbitrary subframe will have its
associated SCI message placed in the first two resource blocks of subchannel 3. This precise (and
predictable) location of the SCI message makes it trivially easy for an attacker to specifically jam
the victim’s SCI message once that victim’s transmission resources (i.e., frame, subframe, and
subchannel(s)) have been identified. If this were changed such that the SCI message was not so
predictably placedwithin a subframe, then our attack would be impossible to execute in the efficient,
stealthy manner heretofore described. Eve would no longer be able to predict and jam Alice’s SCI
message, so despite her continuing ability to predict Alice’s next BSM, Eve’s only chance to block
that BSM would be to use a much wider-band jamming signal to target Eve’s entire BSM. This
would be far less efficient and far more detectable (due to the greater energy required), effectively
ruling out this attack for an intelligent adversary like Eve.
The costs of this mitigation technique lie in its effects on the efficiency of receiving
LTE-V2X transmissions. Under the current physical-layer procedures [19], receivers can quickly
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determine which subchannel(s) contain transmissions after receiving a subframe’s worth of samples
by attempting to decode each location where an SCI message could be located (i.e., at the base
of each subchannel) and only proceeding if an SCI message is found. This is an efficient process
that allows a receiver to rapidly determine whether there is data to decode in a given subframe
and quickly moving on if there is not. Allowing the SCI message to be placed anywhere within
a subchannel would require the receiver to attempt decoding every pair of resource blocks in the
channel as an SCI message, which would clearly require unacceptably high processing times. The
amount of change required to disrupt the attack, though, is not so radical. Merely creating a second
allowable placement for SCI messages within a subchannel (e.g., permitting the SCI to be in the
first or last two resource blocks) would require Eve to either jam both locations, making her more
detectable when one of the two jamming messages does not collide with the targeted message and
become unrecoverable, or guess which location the SCI is in, significantly reducing her accuracy as
jammingBSMs becomes a series of 1
2
-probability guesses instead of the current certainty of success.
This would require receivers to check twice as many locations for SCI messages in each subframe,
which may still be deemed too expensive in terms of latency, although further investigation (which
we leave to future work) would be necessary in order to determine this. In practice, we note that
more than two options may be needed; alternatively, this technique may be combined with other
proposals to restructure the LTE-V2X control channel (e.g., [56]) by spreading the SCI message
across more than one location within the frame. We note also that similar proposals have been
credibly made in related work; for example, the performance enhancement for SPS proposed by
Mughal et al. [56] has a similar potential cost which they argue is offset by the decrease in packet
error rate under their scheme. Similarly, the mitigation technique we propose here will result in
some additional latency, but we contend that this might be acceptable in exchange for the assurance
that targeted jamming attacks like the one we devised cannot be effectively executed without a
significantly increased risk of detection. We leave a full investigation of the feasibility and specific
implementation requirements of this technique to future work.
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5.7.2 Reducing the periodicity of V2V messages
Our targeted sidelink jamming attack takes advantage of the periodicity of V2V messages to
predict the timing of several future messages based on receiving just one from an intended target.
Therefore, one mitigation approach would be to introduce a level of variability into the precisely
periodic nature of V2V transmissions. Under such a system, instead of sending its BSMs exactly
every 100ms, a vehicle might slightly adjust its periodicity with each resource reselection. For
example, it might send a few BSMs with a periodicity of 98ms, then reselect resources and send its
next several BSMs with a periodicity of 103ms. This approach would significantly reduce Eve’s
ability to predict Alice’s messages, as Eve would need to listen and receive two BSMs from Alice
before being able to predict subsequent BSM arrivals. If this technique was combinedwith reducing
the intervals between resource reselections (e.g., from every 5−15 to every 3−7 transmissions),
then Eve’s effectiveness would be cut to nearly nothing. In terms of end-to-end BSM latency, this
approach would not add any significant delay in getting BSMs from one vehicle to others. However,
there are some potentially significant costs to adopting this mitigation technique. For one, related
work (e.g. [72]) has shown that reducing the resource reselection interval tends to lead to lower
PDR as vehicles become more likely to select conflicting resources when selection occurs more
frequently. Second, the impact of varying message periodicity on SPS performance is, to the best
of our knowledge, currently unexplored in the literature. However, variable periodicity has been
proposed to be used in NR-V2X [8, 72], which uses the same basic SPS algorithm as LTE-V2X,
so this may not be a significant concern. Further investigation into the full cost of adopting this
mitigation technique is left to future work.
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6 Sidelink Resource Exhaustion Attack
In the targeted sidelink jamming attack, the attacker has a very specific target—a single victim
vehicle—and her goal is to deny access to the collision-avoidance benefits of LTE-V2X communi-
cation for that specific vehicle. We now consider an entirely different attack with a much broader
objective. Instead of directly jamming BSMs to prevent them from being received, an attacker
might attempt to achieve a similar effect against multiple vehicles simply by making strategic,
prima facie legitimate transmissions in the LTE-V2X channel. To this end, we propose a sidelink
resource exhaustion attack wherein an attacker exploits a vulnerability in the SPS algorithm to
increase the rate at which other vehicles select conflicting resources and inadvertently “jam” each
others’ messages. Put another way, Eve attempts to increase the rate of “natural” packet collisions
that occurs as a result of SPS by biasing other vehicles’ perceptions of channel busyness, tricking
them into selecting resources that are likely to conflict with each other, and thereby drastically
reducing channel throughput. As we will show, Eve can accomplish this by making only protocol-
compliant transmissions, with selectively chosen size and periodicity, in such a manner as to bias
other vehicles’ choices during SPS resource reselection.
6.1 A Vulnerability in SPS
When a vehicle goes through the resource reselection process outlined in Section 2.1.3, its objective
is to select new new radio resourcesSFN , SLI , and subchannel(s) to use for transmitting its BSMs.
An important observation here is that the SPS listening period is 1000ms (i.e., 1000 subframes, or
100 frames), during which a vehicle builds its set of candidate radio resources CRR. However, the
size of CRR is only 10 frames, or 100ms, as this is the defined periodicity for BSMs. Importantly,
note that this means the SPS listening window is an order of magnitude larger than the size ofCRR
in the time domain, meaning that the value of any particular radio resource in CRR is not based
on one, but on many different radio resources observed during the listening period. This lack of
perceptual granularity, i.e., the dependence of each candidate resource in CRR on more than one
resource in the listening period, is a serious flaw in SPS which can be exploited by an attacker.
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Figure 13: Misalignment in sizes of the SPS sensing window and the candidate resource pool.
In more technical detail, consider that there are ten frames in the listening period for
every one in CRR. Thus, as a vehicle processes subframes in the listening period and adds them
to CRR, the value that is recorded for that resource’s busyness (i.e., whether it is in use or not) is
based on an average of ten measurements. An example of this is shown in Figure 13, where the third
subframe of the first frame in CRR is marked as in-use, even though it is only sometimes being
used. The intent of this design is to cause vehicles to probabilistically choose resources which were
observed to be less frequently in-use over the 100 frames preceding resource reselection; however,
it operates on the assumption that vehicles are being “honest” and making their BSM transmissions
only every 100ms as expected. Eve’s goal is to use this lack of granularity in perception of channel
busyness to cause vehicles to misperceive certain resources as being busier than they actually are,
thus causing them to improperly exclude those resources as candidates and choose from a smaller
candidate resource pool than should actually be considered.
6.2 Attack Idea
During SPS resource reselection (see Section 2.1.3), a vehicle will not select radio resources for
which the following conditions are true over the preceding 1000 subframes:
1. A valid SCI message was received in the sidelink control channel.
2. A valid data TBwas received in the sidelink shared channel using the subchannel(s) indicated
by the SCI message.
43
3. The average reference signal received power for the TB resources exceeds a defined threshold
THrx.
These requirements (from [19]) preclude, possibly by design, certain attack approaches. For
example, Eve cannot simply transmit SCI messages in the control channel and claim to be using
resources to transmit data in subchannels that she is not actually using. Other vehicles will know
she is not really transmitting data in those subchannels because the received signal reference power
for the resource blocks where Eve purports to transmit data will be less than THrx. Thus, other
vehicles will consider claiming those resources anyway, thwarting this naive design for an attack.
In any viable attack, Eve is required to make a complete transmission, using both control
and data channels, in any subframe/subchannel resource that she wants other vehicles to perceive
as being in use. Note, importantly, that this does not mean Eve transmits constantly in the same
resources across every frame; our attack is not simply a naive, constant jammer. Also, vehicles are
restricted from transmitting more often than once every 20ms [19]. This requirement is intended
to prevent any one vehicle from using too much bandwidth and consequently degrading system
availability for all other vehicles (i.e., to prevent exactly the type of effect that we strive to create
in this attack). To ensure Eve remains as compliant as possible with LTE-V2X requirements -
an important consideration for maintaining her stealthiness - we have made this a restriction of
our general threat model as well (see Section 4). As we will show, our attack is able to achieve
the effects this requirement was intended to mitigate without violating it or any other LTE-V2X
requirements, emphasizing the need for a better PHY/MAC layer design.
6.3 Experimental Validation
In order to ensure our attack would be possible to execute in a real-world scenario, we needed to
confirm that real LTE-V2X equipment would respond as expected to Eve’s transmissions. Specifi-
cally, we wanted to confirm that periodic, standards-compliant transmissions by Eve would be able
to influence the resource reselection procedure of commercial LTE-V2X equipment. We evaluated
this by setting up an experiment with three devices: one Cohda device, transmitting BSMs at the
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standard 10Hz rate with a transmit power of 23 dBm, one USRP B210 as the attacking device,
transmitting sidelink frames on configurable time/frequency resources with 10 dBm transmit power
at 20ms intervals, and another USRPB210 running a sidelink receiver (adapted from srsRAN [62])
as a channel monitor to observe the impact of Eve’s transmissions on the Cohda device’s use of
radio resources.
The objective of this experiment was to show that it is possible for a device like a
USRP B210, whose maximum transmit power of approximately 10 dBm is well below the 23 dBm
maximum set for Eve (and the 23 dBm Cohda transmission power), to influence the resource
reselection process of the Cohda device. This goal had to be shown indirectly because the Cohda
devices use a proprietary, kernel-level functionality for SPS; therefore, there is no way to directly
view their perceptions of channel usage during reselection. To evaluate Eve’s impact, her USRP
B210 was configured to transmit one BSM on subchannels 1−2 of the first subframe in every other
frame (i.e., every 20ms). Our experimental objective was to determine whether the Cohda device
would avoid using subchannels 1−2 of subframe 1, not only in the frame that Eve transmits in but
in all frames. Note that this means avoiding not only the subchannel pair 1−2 but also the pair
2−3, as the latter selection by the Cohda device would also conflict with Eve’s use of subchannels
1−2.
Due to the inherent randomness of SPS resource reselection, we needed to make sure we
ran this experiment for a sufficiently long period of time as to be certain that if the Cohda device did
not select the resources used by Eve, this was due to the effect of Eve’s attack rather than random
chance. Given a 10MHz channel with 5 subchannels, there are 4 pairs of adjacent subchannels
(1−2, 2−3, 3−4, 4−5) from which one can be selected to carry a 2-subchannel BSM. With 10
LTE frames in a 100ms BSM interval and 10 subframes per frame, this gives 10 ∗ 10 ∗ 4 = 400
total candidate resources to select from. The chance of the Cohda device selecting any particular
resource (i.e., any pair of adjacent subchannels) is therefore 1
400
, and the chance of selecting either
of the two resources that Eve’s transmissions cover is










where R1 and R2 are subchannel pairs 1−2 and 2−3, respectively. Thus, the chances of a device
not selecting either of those resources is ¬P (R1 ∨ R2) = 0.995. Recall that for each reselection,
a vehicle may keep its existing resources and only reselect with probability P (reselect), so the
chance of a vehicle choosing those resources for a given reselection is actually P (reselect)∗0.995.
The actual P (reselect) used by the Cohda devices is unknown, so assuming a worst-case value of
P (reselect) = 0.2, the probability of a device not choosing either of the two resources used by
Eve can be formulated as:
¬P (reselect) ∨
[
P (reselect) ∧ ¬P (R1 ∨R2)
]
(1− 0.2) + (0.2 ∗ 0.995)
0.8 + (0.199) = 0.999
Over n reselections, then, the probability that a device never selects the resources used by Eve is
0.999n. For this probability to be less than 1%, n = log0.9990.01 = 4603 reselections would be
necessary. Knowing that a device performs resource reselection at most once every 1500ms (i.e.,
after 15 transmissions), the experiment needed to be run for 4603 ∗ 1500 = 6.9e6ms = 115.7
minutes in order to claim, with 99% confidence, that the Cohda device’s avoidance of Eve’s
resources was due to her transmissions rather than simple probability.
Therefore, the experiment was run for 116 minutes to meet this level of confidence.
Results from the monitor device, as shown in Figure 14, confirmed that the Cohda device did
indeed avoid choosing the resources used by Eve over a 116-minute period. Although it selected
every other resource at about the same rate, the Cohda device did not choose subchannel pair 1−2
or 2−3 of subframe 1 (called out in red in Figure 14) due to Eve’s use of those resources in just
50% of frames. This validates the central premise of our attack by demonstrating the ability of
an attacker to influence a commercial LTE-V2X device’s selection of radio resources with nothing
more than standard-compliant, periodic transmissions in the LTE-V2X channel.
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Figure 14: Resources selected by the Cohda device during a 116-minute sidelink resource exhaustion attack.
Values on the x-axis are candidate resources (subchannel pairs) grouped by subframe 1−10.
6.4 Attacking the LTE-V2X Channel
Although our hardware experimentation was necessarily limited to an indirect proof of our premise,
we can more thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of our attack against an LTE-V2X channel using
MATLAB simulation. Our objective here is to extrapolate from our experimental results to show
that Eve can have the same impact on multiple vehicles as we showed on one, to the extent that
vehicles begin avoiding so many resources that they begin selecting conflicting resources and
interfering with each others BSMs. To accomplish this, we use the same MATLAB simulation
environment described in Section 5.4. We ran simulations for different approaches that Eve might
take; for example, we sought to determine how Eve’s use of varying transmission size (i.e., number
of subchannels) and transmission periodicity would improve or decrease her success. We also
varied the number of simulated vehicles using the channel to determine whether Eve’s attack is
more effective when the channel is under certain levels of use.
While we evaluated how changes in Eve’s transmission periodicity and size impacted her
effectiveness, we configured her to reselect resources almost as often as she is allowed to. In a real
LTE-V2X environment, Eve’s continued use of the same subframe and subchannel over time would
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Figure 15: Effects of the attacker’s transmission size on effectiveness of sidelink resource exhaustion.
cause direct packet collisions, which is not her intended approach, so we allow (and require) her to
change resources in such a manner as to avoid packet collisions whenever possible. Technically, it
is at each vehicle’s discretion (e.g., for latency requirements) to reselect resources at any rate up to
and including after every transmission [19]; however, we configured Eve to change resources after
every 2−3 transmissions instead as we consider changing resources after every transmission to be
unrealistic. We thus ensured that Eve was configured to avoid using the same resources as were
being used by any other simulated vehicle, affirming that any observable impacts on the channel
result from the attack rather than from Eve inadvertently jamming vehicles’ messages directly.
In our first round of simulations, we held Eve’s transmission periodicity constant at 20ms
and varied her transmission size between 1−5 subchannels. Eve’s goal is to prevent other vehicles
from using as many resources as possible, not only in the frames she transmits in but in all frames
(thus exploiting the vulnerability in SPS described in Section 6.1). The results for these simulations
are shown in Figure 15. Comparedwith the control simulation (i.e., the simulationwith no attacker),
which is shown as a solid blue line in Figure 15, we found that Eve’s attack reduced overall PDR
irrespective of the number of vehicles using the channel, although the most significant impacts
occurred when a greater number of vehicles were present. This makes sense, as Eve’s use of more
subchannels for her transmissions means other vehicles believe there are fewer unused resources
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Figure 16: Effects of the attacker’s transmission periodicity on effectiveness of sidelink resource exhaustion.
to choose from, causing them to select resources from a smaller pool and consequently to choose
conflicting resources with greater frequency. The results in Figure 15 show that just by transmitting
normal, 2-subchannel BSMs with 20ms periodicity, Eve is able to cause an overall PDR reduction
of nearly 40%; with slightly larger messages, Eve can have an impact approaching a 50% reduction
in overall PDR. This demonstrates both that sidelink resource exhaustion is effective and that its
effectiveness stands largely irrespective of Eve’s transmission size.
We also evaluated how Eve’s transmission periodicity impacts the effectiveness of her at-
tack. This is important to consider becausewe presume that Evewill want to transmit as infrequently
as possible to minimize her chances of being detected. So, we performed additional simulations
to evaluate Eve’s effectiveness at different transmission periodicities, holding transmission size
constant at 2 subchannels to imitate a legitimate vehicle sending standard-size BSMs. Figure 16
shows the results of these simulations. We configured Eve to vary her transmission periodicity
between 20, 30, 50 and 100ms (the acceptable choices for LTE-V2X BSM periodicity [7, 67]). Our
results, shown in Figure 16, show Eve’s ability to cause severe degradation in PDR regardless of
her transmission periodicity. In fact, for a periodicity of 50ms, Eve is able to reduce PDR by nearly
50%. Figure 16 shows that once again, Eve’s effectiveness increases with the number of vehicles
using the channel; as before, when more vehicles are present and must select resources from the
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same perceptually diminished resource pool, they tend to select conflicting resources with greater
frequency.
One might express concern that our attack is less effective when the channel is less busy.
This is an unavoidable consequence of our attack design, as its primary mechanism is abusing SPS
to increase the probability with which multiple other vehicles select conflicting resources. Thus,
when fewer vehicles are present, the attack is inherently less effective (although not impotent). Two
factors should be considered to contextualize this apparent shortcoming. First, our results come
from an idealized channel model where SPS resource selection conflicts are the only causes for
packet loss. In a real environment, packet loss for any number of vehicles will be significantly
higher than our idealized baseline due to the harsh conditions of a noisy, dynamic V2V channel [57].
Therefore, what we have shown is actually theminimum amount of additional packet loss that Eve’s
actions will add on top of any packet loss that occurs from environment factors like multipath
fading, noise, and others. Second, our results show that Eve’s impact is inversely related to the
number of vehicles using the channel. When more vehicles are present, SPS is supposed to allow
the channel to balance the load effectively so that vehicles more or less end up fully using all
channel resources, with each vehicle using no more than one BSM slot per period in the worst-case
scenario to minimize BSM latency. However, we have demonstrated that the busier the channel
is, the greater havoc Eve can inflict; thus, our attack reduces LTE-V2X channel throughput under
exactly the conditions when it has the greatest need for maximal efficiency.
6.5 Efficiency and Effort Considerations
As we did with the targeted sidelink jamming attack, it is useful to discuss the effectiveness and
efficiency of this attack in a real-world environment.
6.5.1 Efficiency
Evaluating the duty cycle of our sidelink resource exhaustion attack reveals it to be highly efficient,
particularly when greater numbers of vehicles are using the channel. For this attack, because it is
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against the entire channel rather than just one vehicle, it makes sense to talk about duty cycle in
terms of both frequency and time. In a 100ms BSM period, there are 100 ∗ 50 = 5, 000 resources
that can be used. Eve transmits every 20ms using a variable number of subchannels, but we will
use 5 here as a worst-case argument for calculating the maximum duty cycle. Thus, Eve transmits
in 5 ∗ 20 = 100 resources per BSM period. As shown in Figure 15, this achieves a reduction in
the number of used channel resources of about 70% in a very short period of time. Therefore,
Eve’s use of 100 resources per BSM interval results in an effective elimination of 3, 500 of 5, 000
resources in subsequent intervals, a duty cycle of just 2.9%. This is highly efficient attack which,
as Figure 15 illustrates, only gets more efficient as time elapses.
6.5.2 Attack range
Another important consideration is the effective range of Eve’s attack. As we have shown, sidelink
resource exhaustion is far more effective when larger number of vehicles are using the LTE-V2X
channel, meaning it is necessary that a sufficiently large number of vehicles are within range of
Eve’s transmissions for the attack to be as effective as desired. Since Eve is behaving in the
same manner as other vehicles (excepting her resource reselection interval and non-random choices
during resource reselection), we can reasonably say that her transmissions impact other vehicles’
SPS decisions within the same range that genuine transmissions would—of course, this is the key
insight behind our attack. One element of the SPS algorithm not heretofore discussed is the third
criterion, which states that a resource shall be excluded from CRR if, ”[t]he average reference
signal received power for the...resources exceeds a defined threshold THrx” [19]. From this, we
can conclude that any vehicles affected by Evemust be within a distance where THrx is exceeded by
Eve’s signals when they arrive. Unfortunately, the standard does not specify a value for THrx and
leaves it to be defined on an implementation-specific basis. Based on LTE-V2X field testing [73],
a −95 dBm received power level is sufficient to successfully recover an LTE-V2X transmission,
from which we can use (1) and a link-budget calculation to determine that Eve should be able to
impact any vehicle within approximately 8.06 km. Now, as this is roughly 8 times the expected
communication range of LTE-V2X, it is important to point out that when factors beyond free-
space path loss (e.g., multipath fading, noise, interference) are considered, this distance will be
51
considerably less. However, this calculation is sufficient to underscore the main point, which is
that Eve should be able to impact any vehicles that are within the normal LTE-V2X range of 1 km.
A more specific description of Eve’s range would need to be performed on an implementation-
specific basis where the value of THRX is known, which would facilitate a precise calculation of
Eve’s effective range and any required adjustments to compensate for THRX increasing during the
execution of SPS. Such a further investigation is left to future work.
6.6 Detection Strategies
We can now turn to answering our second research question with respect to the sidelink resource
exhaustion attack, which we do by discussing how detectable Eve is during execution of the attack.
As we did with our first attack, we begin by examining how and why the state-of-the-art approach
to BSM jamming detection, which is based on monitoring overall PDR, is not an effective approach
to detecting our resource exhaustion attack. We then propose a superior alternative based on least-
squares regression analysis and show, through simulation, that it can effectively detect our attack
where state-of-the-art techniques cannot.
6.6.1 Naive observation of vehicle transmission patterns
An intuitive approach for detecting our resource exhaustion attack relies on observing when a
vehicle’s transmission patterns do not align with expectations, which may be based either on
operating standards (e.g., [19]) or on a hypothetical system monitor’s real-time monitoring of an
active system. For example, an observation that periodic transmissions are using up the same
n resources of every other frame might be suspicious, especially if this pattern continued over a
significant period of time, as such a usage pattern would rarely emerge naturally from fair and
honest use of SPS by all vehicles. This monitoring approach may allow easy detection of Eve if
she uses certain naive attack parameters, e.g., transmitting larger-than-average messages at short
intervals in the same subframes for a long period of time. However, our Eve is an intelligent attacker
who does not facilitate such easy detection of her actions. If Eve breaks up her transmission pattern
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(e.g., by varying transmission size and subframe as frequently as allowed), then she will be more
difficult to detect. BSM size is dynamic in reality; thus, Eve’s regular changes of message size
would not be suspicious. Similarly, since BSMs are allowed to be sent more frequently than the
regular 10Hz rate [67], Eve’s transmissions at 20, 30, or 50ms intervals9 are equally acceptable.
Eve’s compliance with periodicity and message size requirements mean she can execute
this attack while remaining syntactically compliant with the LTE-V2X standards. However, it is
equally important that Eve remain semantically compliant with V2V protocols. Her compliance
with required power levels, transmission periodicity, etc. is irrelevant if the messages themselves
contain nonsense data or obviously falsified information, as it would be easy for receivers and any
form of system monitor to pick up on regular transmissions of gibberish as a suspicious goings-on.
However, if Eve sends genuine V2V BSMs, she may be required to identify herself in some way,
e.g., for authentication purposes. This is a risky proposition because, while doing so may get past
initial semantic message checks, if her traffic is ultimately identified as malicious than she will have
identified herself to the authorities in the course of trying to avoid detection. There are a variety of
ways that Eve may attempt to avoid detection by a semantic system monitor, but most of them fall
outside the scope of this thesis; for example, abuse or theft of credentials for an upper-layer security
protocol might be a way around such monitoring. The exploration of how upper-layer detection
and evasion may play out in detail is left to future work.
6.6.2 Monitoring overall resource usage patterns
Amore intelligent systemmonitormay attempt to detect our resource exhaustion attack by observing
overall radio resource usage patterns rather than looking for irregularities in the usage of specific
resources. In the frequency domain, a monitor may observe each subchannel over time to verify
that they are all being used equally, or at least in consistently unequal ratios10. Since Eve’s overall
9Eve will also not be the only vehicle changing her transmission periodicity. 3GPP TS 36.213 [19] permits—in fact,
requires—vehicles to alter their periodicity as needed to meet requirements for latency, error correction, quality of
service, etc.
10Given the most common BSM size of 2 subchannels, subchannels 2−4 are naturally going to be more often used
than subchannels 1 or 5 because multiple pairs of adjacent subchannels overlap the middle three, but only one pair
overlaps each of subchannel 1 (1−2) and 5 (4−5)
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objective relies on transmitting in specific subchannels, aiming to make them seem more used
than they really are, a monitor may observe all subchannels to see if any particular subchannel(s)
are being abnormally underutilized. For example, if subchannel 2 is only being used for 2−3
transmissions per frame over a sustained period of time when other subchannels are being used
completely, the monitor might become suspicious that vehicles are not selecting subchannel 2
despite its general availability.
Eve may attempt to circumvent this detection approach by regularly changing the radio
resources that she wants to make appear in-use. Since all vehicles in the system reselect resources
at most once every 1.5 s (15 BSMs at 100ms intervals), and also because the listening period for
reselection looks back only 1s, Eve can ensure she influences every vehicle’s reselection process
by targeting certain resources for exclusion over a∼3 s interval. Thus, all vehicles may select from
one diminished resource pool for a few seconds, then from a different, similarly diminished pool,
and so on. A monitor might notice brief periods when one or more subchannels are underutilized,
but the lack of persistent underutilization of any specific resources would preclude straightforward
identification of anomalies that would be indicative of this attack. So, attempting to detect sidelink
resource exhaustion by monitoring the usage of specific resources (i.e., subchannels) is unlikely to
be a viable technique.
6.7 Detection Through Regression Analysis
Although monitoring the usage of specific subchannels (or subframes) over time is not a workable
solution for detecting our attack, monitoring the overall number of resources used over time is likely
to be a more fruitful approach. By examining channel resource usage levels over time, it is possible
to observe when the pool of used resources appears to be diminishing for unknown reasons—i.e.,
because a sidelink resource exhaustion attack is underway. This approach is particularly useful over
periods of timewhen the number of vehicles remains relatively constant becausewhen this condition
holds true, the general levels of resource usage in the channel should remain consistent. That is to
say, if n vehicles are using the channel over a period of one minute, one would expect that while
they will use different resources over that period (due to many iterations of resource reselection),
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Figure 17: Trends in channel resource usage over time when the channel is under attack versus normal
operation. Least-squares regression lines (black and dashed) show clearly divergent trends between these
scenarios, facilitating detection of the attack.
the total number of used resources should be nearly constant. If, instead, a monitor observes fewer
and fewer resources being used as time goes on—something that, by design, never occurs under
normal SPS operation—then this would be a strong indicator that a resource exhaustion attack is
underway. One way to monitor channel resource usage in this fashion is to approximate trends in
channel usage over time using least-squares regression analysis, thus allowing an alert to be raised
if overall resource usage trends downward significantly (in a statistical sense) over time.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, we ran the same simulations as before
(varying Eve’s transmission sizes and periodicity for different numbers of vehicles), but with a
simulated monitor set up to record the total number of used resources in each frame over time.
Then, we applied least-squares regression analysis to the collected data. In Figure 17, the results are
shown for the simulation with no attacker as well as one of the simulations with an attacker present.
The results shown in orange were collected during the attack with 100 simulated vehicles using the
channel. As indicated by the black, dashed least-squares regression lines on each scattered data
series, there is an obvious divergence of trends in resource usage when an attack is or is not ongoing.
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In the absence of an attacker, the slope of the least-squares line is δ = 2.4e−3; as expected (see
above), this is a negligible change. On the other hand, when an attacker is present, regression yields
a strong negative trend of δ = −0.2. More in-depth analysis and experiments with real equipment
will be required to establish a threshold for when the trend in resource usage is sufficiently negative
to deem indicative of an attack; however, it suffices here to note that the clearly divergent regression
lines shown in Figure 17 support the validity of this technique for detecting our attack.
As a final point of discussion, one might legitimately wonder how Eve is able to have such
a significantly negative impact on resource usage over time, since she should only be able to impact
the channel usage levels inasmuch as any single vehicle can. Two factors are involved in explaining
these results. First, Eve is transmitting more frequently—importantly, though, at an entirely
legitimate and unsuspicious rate—than other vehicles generally will. This allows her to make
certain subchannels seem busier than they are, causing vehicles undergoing resource reselection
to avoid those subchannels. Second, Eve’s frequent and deliberate reselection of resources allows
her to cause a sort of cascade effect that pushes other vehicles eventually towards using fewer
and fewer resources. Figure 18 depicts how this works using a simplified channel model with
three subchannels and five subframes per frame. An arbitrary number of vehicles are making
transmissions, which are shown in green, while Eve’s transmissions are indicated in red. At the top
of Figure 18, the normal behavior of SPS is shown. After the listening period, a candidate resource
set has been created, with the resources used least frequently (i.e., those from which new resources
will be selected) shown with green highlighting. With no attacker, candidate resources are spread
across all subchannels. However, once the attack begins, this changes rapidly. As Figure 18
shows, Eve’s transmissions at first push vehicles away from using the top subchannel. Then, after
several vehicles reselect resources based on this biased candidate resource set, observe that Eve’s
transmissions, which are now in themiddle subchannel, cause the resulting candidate resource set to
have low-use resources almost exclusively in the top subchannel. After one additional iteration, all
of the candidate resources with low usage are in the same subchannel. By the end of this simplified
example, every vehicle that needs to reselect resources will attempt to choose new resources in
the same subchannel, illustrating how the used bandwidth narrows over time during the sidelink
resource exhaustion attack. Figure 18 is simplified out of necessity—depicting the real process,
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Figure 18: Visualization of the mechanics behind sidelink resource exhaustion.
which occurs over hundreds of frames, will not fit within the confines of a page—but its point
applies equally to the full-sized LTE-V2X channel. As the illustrated process continues, Eve is
eventually able to exclude not only one, but first two, then three, and possibly even four out of five
(real) subchannels from being used by other vehicles. This is the reason for the observable decline
in overall channel usage during the attack which can be seen in Figure 18, as well as the core reason
why the attack is effective at causing a decrease in PDR, since the reduction in the number of used
subchannels in a real system inevitably leads to some vehicles choosing conflicting resources and
inadvertently jamming each others’ BSMs.
6.8 A Mitigation Proposal
Our sidelink resource exhaustion attack exploits a fundamental vulnerability in SPS, the misalign-
ment in size between the listening period and candidate resource set. One possible mitigation
for our attack, then, is addressing this vulnerability by modifying the SPS algorithm so that this
misalignment no longer exists. This could proceed in two directions. First, the length of the SPS
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listening period could be reduced from 1000ms to 100ms (the size of the candidate resource
set). Doing so would eliminate the possibility of earlier, irrelevant transmissions (including the
attacker’s) from influencing a vehicle’s choice of resources; however, it would also reduce the
vehicle’s ability to accurately estimate channel busyness. The costs of this have not, to the best
of our knowledge, previously been studied. We suppose such costs might include a higher rate of
packet collisions due to vehicles being less aware of who is using the channel when selecting new
resources, due to the potential that this reduced awareness could increase the rate at which vehicles
choose conflicting resources. However, a full investigation of this avenue of approach requires
further study and is left to future work.
The alternative approach is expanding the size of the candidate resource set to 1000ms
to match the SPS listening period. This bears a certain similarity to proposals for SPS performance
enhancement such as [57, 68, 72]. A common theme in those and other related works is the idea
of extending the period between resource reselections to reduce the chance that vehicles choose
conflicting resources (a consequence of reducing the number of reselections in general). Here,
rather than reducing the number of reselections, we propose to give a similar level of flexibility
by allowing vehicles a greater choice of resources to use during each reselection. In doing so,
we eliminate the ability of Eve to improperly constrain resource selections, as her rate-limited
transmissions will not have nearly such an effect on a larger candidate resource set as they can
on the current configuration. One notable consequence (and potential downside) of this approach
is that the interval between the last BSM preceding reselection and the first to be sent afterwards
would be much greater than the standard 100ms, ranging in fact up to a full 1 s between messages.
On average, we expect the interval to be closer to 500ms, but this is still a five-fold increase
in latency for one out of every 5−15 messages. Whether or not this is an acceptable price to
pay requires further investigation, particularly concerning real-world traffic flows and whether an
intermittently longer delay between BSMs is likely to significantly increase the likelihood of an
otherwise avoidable collision occurring. We leave this further investigation to future work.
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7 Comparing Our Novel Denial-of-Service Attacks
We have presented two novel DoS attacks against LTE-V2X: targeted sidelink jamming and sidelink
resource exhaustion. In presenting each attack, we discussed real-world considerations like
jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR), effective range, and power efficiency in Sections 6.5 and 5.3.1.
Now, we can consider the respective strengths and weaknesses of each attack compared with the
other.
7.1 General Effort
In Section 5.3, we determined that our targeted sidelink jamming attack has a duty cycle of 10%.
This is prima facie a fairly inefficient attack, especially when compared with other examples from
related work. However, one must also consider that this relatively high duty cycle is a trade-off for
deniability. Jamming attacks of this type (i.e., which aim to increase the noise level for a specific
signal so as to make it irrecoverable by a receiver) with very low duty cycle often require actions
which are drastically different from normal transmission (e.g., sending a high-power, narrow-band
jamming signal for a very short interval). Our attack, in contrast, has the advantage of being
deniable in the context of SPS (as we mentioned in Section 5.1), so detection techniques that alert
on abnormal energy levels in the channel will not be effective. That said, the efficiency of our
targeted sidelink jamming attack pales in comparison to that of sidelink resource exhaustion. We
calculated that the latter has an impressive duty cycle as low as 2.9% (see Section 6.5), making it
far more efficient with respect to this metric. Also, sidelink resource exhaustion is able to inflict
serious DoS effects on a large number of vehicles, whereas targeted sidelink jamming only affects
one targeted victim. Which of these is more desirable will depend heavily on the motivations
of each specific attacker; if mass disruptions in the LTE-V2X channel are desired, then sidelink
resource exhaustion is the way to go, but targeted sidelink jamming is a far better (and less overt)
approach for silencing a specific victim’s LTE-V2X transmissions. One might also argue that an
attacker who is sufficiently motivated to single out a particular vehicle for an attack might find
the extra effort required to be acceptable, although this would be a subjective choice. Overall,
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Table 3: Efficiency comparison of targeted sidelink jamming and sidelink resource exhaustion.
Duty Cycle PTX Effective Range
Targeted Sidelink Jamming 10% 10− 23 dBm Varies with PTX
Sidelink Resource Exhaustion 2.9% 23 dBm ∼1 km
each of our attacks has trade-offs between efficiency and objectives which must be balanced on a
case-by-case basis for an attacker to decide their approach.
7.2 Power Efficiency
From the perspectives of required transmit power and length of the attack, targeted sidelink jamming
is a more flexible and generally more efficient attack than sidelink resource exhaustion. As we
discussed in Section 5.3, targeted sidelink jamming is effective whenever the JSR is at or above
0.04 dB, meaning that the jamming signal will effectively jam BSMs at any receiver where Eve’s
and Alice’s signals arrive with approximately equal power. Achieving this JSR leaves Eve with
much discretion over her actions, allowing her to customize her transmit power, attack duration, and
distance from Alice as needed for specific situations. For example, Eve might carefully position
herself along a road where she knows Alice regularly travels in such a manner as to jam messages
over a very small area for the short period when Alice is present (e.g., at a blind intersection that
Alice must pass through) using minimal transmit power. Alternatively, Eve could follow a car-
length’s distance behind or beside Alice and transmit with equal power to her over a longer period
of time, effectively jamming a wider area at the price of lower power efficiency. These examples
illustrate the range of options that Eve has with respect to power efficiency when executing the
targeted sidelink jamming attack.
In contrast, Eve has less discretion with her transmit power level and attack duration
when executing a sidelink resource exhaustion attack. We showed in Section 6.4 that the attack
is most effective when more vehicles are in range of each other and using the channel, strongly
motivating Eve to maximize her transmit power in order to affect the greatest number of victims.
Thus, Eve is generally likely to use her maximum allowable transmit power of 23 dBm, with the
exception of limited circumstances where vehicle density is extremely high (e.g., in a major city
60
center, on an interstate at rush hour). We also showed in Section 6.4 that the attack becomes
effective over time, requiring Eve to continue transmitting in order to maintain the effectiveness of
the attack. Comparatively, then, targeted sidelink jamming is likely to more often allow the attacker
to accomplish her objectives with lower transmit power levels and a shorter attack duration than
sidelink resource exhaustion, giving the upper hand to the former attack with respect to this metric.
7.3 Required Distance for Effectiveness
Sidelink resource exhaustion has a range of effectiveness that depends solely on the transmit power
chosen by the attacker, but generally covers the standard LTE-V2X communication range of 1 km.
Targeted sidelink jamming has a range of effectiveness that is also dependent on the transmit power
chosen by the attacker; however, the effective range is based on JSR, which is also dependent
on the distance from the victim. Thus, targeted sidelink jamming has a more limited range of
effectiveness and can impact receivers which, generally speaking, are closer to the attacker than
the victim (although the specific delineation of the jamming area is dependent on the attacker’s
transmit power). All of that said, though, comparing the effective distance for each attack is
of limited usefulness due to their divergent objectives. Sidelink resource exhaustion is more
effective when more vehicles are in range and is intended to affect all channel users, so a larger
range of effectiveness is both necessary and desirable. In contrast, targeted sidelink jamming is
directed against a single victim, in response to whose movements the attacker can customize power
and positioning decisions, so a larger range of effectiveness is neither necessary nor (potentially)
desirable. In summary, sidelink resource exhaustion is superior in the strictest sense that it has a
broader range of effectiveness; however, the usefulness of this conclusion is limited by the context
of attacker intent.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we identified fundamental vulnerabilities in the PHY and MAC layers of LTE-V2X
and devised novel, intelligent DoS attacks to exploit them. We set out to answer two important
research questions, the first being whether the PHY/MAC layers of LTE-V2X are sufficiently secure
as to prevent exploitation by an intelligent attacker. We have definitively answered this question in
the negative, showing through our two novel DoS attacks that significant improvements are needed
to bring LTE-V2X up to this level of security. To this end, we proposed and validated detection
techniques for each of our attacks—using an unsupervised cluster analysis algorithm and regression
analysis, respectively—also; for each attack we laid out at least one promising mitigation approach
as a basis for further study. These contributions addressed our second research question, which
asked how we could effectively detect any attacks we identified despite the attacker’s efforts to
remain undetected.
In future work, we may investigate any of the various avenues we have indicated through-
out this thesis. The specific method to be used by an attacker to subvert anonymization techniques
and identify the sender of a particular BSM is well worthy of study and has broad applications
beyond our scope of LTE-V2X DoS attacks. With respect to our targeted sidelink jamming attack,
we intend to further analyze its effectiveness and determine whether, as anticipated, it is more
stealthy in a realistic channel with considerations made for factors like multi-path fading and lower
signal-to-noise ratio. Also, a more detailed study on how traffic patterns would affect the interval in
which a monitor might be able to attempt detection of the attack would round out our discussion on
that topic. For our sidelink resource exhaustion attack, we would be interested to evaluate how the
additional considerations of upper-layer security protocols would help or harm the attacker’s ability
to remain undetected. Similarly, extending our attack design to factor in the resource-reservation
capabilities that exist in some upper-layer V2V protocols may help increase the effectiveness of
our attack. Finally, for both of our attacks, we intend to pursue the various mitigation techniques
we have proposed with greater rigor, with the hope of ultimately devising a low-cost (in terms of
system performance) mitigation for each attack to be applied to a revision of the LTE-V2X standard.
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Appendix - Optimizing Sidelink Jamming through
Abuse of Upper-Layer Security Protocols
This appendix describes the concept for an optimized version of the attack in Section 5 wherein
Eve could transmit far less often and achieve the same results as our original attack. Since we
were able to achieve experimental results that were promising, we include brief discussion of this
optimization here along with a description of our obstacles and reasons for relegating it to this
appendix rather than including it in the main thesis report. A bit of brief additional background
is necessary to explain our approach. At the upper layers of V2V protocols, security is provided
through the IEEE 1609.2 standards [38]. This standard provides, among other things, a requirement
for the use of certificate-based message authentication using digital signatures. This is intended
to mitigate upper-layer security threats like message spoofing, credential theft, message tampering,
etc. Thus, each BSM is digitally signed using a certificate which must be validated by the receiving
vehicle. In order for the receiver to validate the signature on a message, the receiver needs to obtain
the signer’s certificate in order to validate it, so BSMs include not only digital signatures but also
the certificates used to generate them. However, certificates are relatively large and including them
in every message adds latency, so vehicles only include their certificate in every fifth message [67].
The four messages between each certificate-bearing message include a SHA-256 digest of the
certificate instead so that the receiver can look up the certificate received on a previous message to
authenticate messages which do not include the certificate. Our idea, based on knowledge of these
interwoven requirements, was to allow Eve to jam only those messages from Alice which include
Alice’s certificate. Since other vehicles would only receive the four out of every five messages from
Alice which do not bear Alice’s certificate, those vehicles would be unable to verify the messages’
signatures and consequently would be forced to ignore them. This optimization, if successful,
would improve Eve’s efficiency significantly, allowing her to cause >90% packet loss for Alice
while only actively jamming 20% of her messages.
We validated this approach using the same setup described in Section 5.2.1, confirming
that this attack has the potential to be effective against commercial LTE-V2X equipment. However,
we encountered a significant obstacle: a certificate-bearing message is often the first to be trans-
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mitted after Alice performs SPS resource reselection. Eve is not able to jam the first message after
resource reselection (see Section 5), so this certificate would be distributed to all vehicles within
range. Once Alice’s certificate is distributed, Eve would need to fall back on the attack as described
in Section 5.1 to remain effective. We analyzed the severity of this problem and found that it is a
critical issue with this optimization: in over 85% of cases, Alice distributes her certificate on the
first message after resource reselection within 15 seconds of Eve beginning her attack. As we were
unable to overcome this obstacle, we present this appendix both due to the importance of negative
results and because we believe this is not an entirely insurmountable obstacle. Some related work
(e.g., [52]) has very recently looked at using machine learning techniques to accurately predict the
resources a vehicle will reselect; if such an approach could be adopted, then this optimization may
ultimately prove viable. For now, we leave such an investigation to future work.
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